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CHAPTER IX

Culture and the Development of Personality

C U L T U R E
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

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Since there is, to say the least of it, a strong argument for saying that we only exist as persons because of our social interactions, it may readily be accepted that the sort of persons we become will be largely determined by the culture in which we are brought up. It is, as has been said before, a mistake to think of the "persons" as a prefabricated structure waiting at birth to be erected, well or ill, by the adults in charge of it. Prior to an infant's earliest contacts with other human beings it simply does not exist as a "person" at all.

The way in which our personalities are shaped by the cultures in which we participate is, however, extremely complicated, and to deal with it we require two models. In the first place we can think of the culture as a fixed system of accepted behaviour to which the newcomer has to adjust himself, and to play his part in which the child has to be trained. Though the culture of course is continually changing, sometimes very slowly, and sometimes very fast, we may picture it as a relatively static structure, confronting the new member of the society, and we speak of him or her as "adjusting" himself or herself to it. We have to analyse the concept of culture, and thus make our model more precise, we have to see the sorts of characteristics which must be acquired, and we have to find out how the training is accomplished.

The culture itself, however, is an abstraction from actual social interer

course. We must therefore make use of another model which presents the actors of the culture in dynamic relation with one another. This really involves a further analysis of the culture itself.

The purpose of this may be seen if we take an example. Supposing it is culturally acceptable for parents to treat their children with great solicitude, to give them food whenever they cry for it, not to force them to discipline themselves more than is appropriate to their capacity to control themselves, and, in general, to support them in such a way that the sense of insecurity is reduced to a minimum. It is argued that the resulting personality will be different from what it would be if they were given less attention. This argument is based partly on clinical studies of maladjusted persons in our own culture, and partly on general psychological considerations which are more or less confirmed by observations in everyday life.

The clinical observation of psycho-analysts has made it almost certain that what happens in infancy has a profound effect on later life. What this adds to common sense observation is the point that we must not think of infants as mere bundles registering but little; we must rather think of them in terms which we all agree to be appropriate to children and adults. Children and adults feel secure when they can count on their needs being satisfied. They feel a sense of worth, a sense that other people appreciate them and so forth. If, on the other hand, they are systematically denied attention, thwarted in the satisfying of their desires, and continually meet with rebuff, they resent it. They may 'show temper', they may be cowed, they may become sly, they

in the same wares. Yet we can think of "taking off one's hat to a lady" as being the culturally expected behaviour of men in one culture, certain action as the "right" thing for priests to do in certain contexts, and certain conduct as appropriate to shop assistants. To cope with this contrast between actual varieties of performance, and the underlying similarity of pattern, Linton (1) proposes the term "real culture" and "culture construct". "The real culture of any society consists of the actual behaviour and so on of its members." This, in any culturally defined situation, will constitute a range of conduct with in which what is done is acceptable, outside which it is reprehensible or inefficient or both. The "culture construct" is the "ideal type" of conduct which the scientist invents by a process of abstraction from the "real culture". It is a rather indefinite norm; indefinite because no one has any clear image of it, and a "norm" because there is an "ought" attached to it.

A culture-pattern, then, is no strait-jacket imposing identity of behaviour on all members of the society. Each plays out his part in his own particular style. This brings us to the problem of individual differences. "Every man is in certain respects (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other man." (2) This is obvious enough. Every infant is "like no other infant", and immediately he is born he is in contact with men and women who are like no other men and women. Differences between persons are catered for, but a difficulty presents itself. Consider the simple case of

(1) Linton, R. Cultural Background of Personality. Kegan Paul, 1947, p 28.

(2) Kluckhohn, C. (ed) Personality, p 35.

an infant and its mother. Since she is different from all other mothers, she will manipulate her child in her own unique way — indeed, that is part of what we mean by saying that she is different from all other mothers. If she bears identical twins she will behave uniquely to each so that they start off with different treatment. Thus much of the difference between people is due to the different treatment they have had from their mother, and now we may add their father and, indeed, anyone else with whom they come in contact. Can we therefore say that they all start alike, but receive different treatment? Not at all. First, this would leave the difference between the adults ultimately unaccounted for, and second, there is evidence that certain psychological characteristics are partially innately determined. The latter evidence is, of course, strongest in the case of intellectual ability, but even then, as we have seen, it is quite impossible to assign the proportion of any performance due to innate constitution, and that due to experience or training.

It is, however, abundantly clear that a man's abilities and his temperament have been influenced by his social contacts, in the sense that if these contacts had been different his abilities and his temperament would probably have been different too. The range of variation, if one envisages all possible social environments, would appear to be fixed by his initial constitution. What that range is we have at present no means of discovering. His "initial constitution" is therefore a residual category. It must be conceived of as an indefinite potentiality, wherein all infants differ, with the possible exception of identical twins (and even here interuterine life may be a differentiating factor). It is a residual category because what we say in effect

is: all the differences between children which we cannot trace to their social environment must be there from the start. We do not begin with a knowledge of the initial constitution and then watch the play of social environment on it; we begin with the infant in social relationship, and have recourse to the initial constitution when we cannot tell any other more plausible story.

Thus the infant with its unique but unknown potentialities is born and immediately meets adults and children each with his or her unique individuality, which is due in turn to their unique experience, springing out of the meeting of their unique constitution with their unique social environment.

So much for the new-born child. Confronting him is the "culture pattern". To bring some formal order into this, Linton and other writers make use of the following concepts: status, role, and basic personality pattern. What we actually have is people behaving overtly and covertly (i. e. in ways for which we use body language and in ways for which we use mind language). What we are interested in is such ranges of actual behaviour as are culturally acceptable. This behaviour is centered round certain positions in the society. There is appropriate behaviour for children, appropriate behaviour for adult men, appropriate behaviour for adult women, and so forth. These positions have been called "statuses" and the appropriate conduct to each status is the "role". Statuses, however, are not all of the same order, and Linton (1) distinguishes between ascribed statuses and achieved statuses. The former "are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate difference or abilities". Everyone

is an infant at some stage of his career, and if he survives he reaches the statuses of "child", and , in due course, of adulthood and old age. Nearly everyone is male or female, husband or wife, father or mother and so forth. To each of these statuses a certain role is ascribed by every culture to the persons occupying them.

The "achieved statuses" are those which are not reached by some natural process; they are specialisms which "are left open to be filled through competition and individual effort". There are certain statuses which in all societies are what Linton calls "ascribed". The "achieved" statuses, on the other hand, will clearly vary from society to society; in the first place the jobs which have to be done by specialists will vary from group to group, and in the second place, if all the males of a certain family were brought up to be priests, the status would be "ascribed" to them, whereas if priests were selected because they are deemed to have certain characteristics, then this status would be "achieved" by them.

There are, then, statuses ascribed on a biological basis, and statuses achieved by effort. In a society with class differences these will further define the ascribed statuses, and may determine to a large extent the accessibility to statuses which are achieved. Thus an "upper-class" child will have a status and its role to play which is different from that of a "lower-class" child in many respects. He will also be more likely to achieve the status of Judge or Archbishop, should he desire it, than the boy

(1) The Study of Man. Appleton. Century, 1936. p. 115

from a "lower-class" level in the hierarchy.

A few more points remain to be noted. Clearly any given individual can occupy several statuses at once, and in succession. How far one says that he is playing a multiple role, or a single one at any given moment, will depend upon the purpose of one's inquiry. A bank manager in action is carrying out the roles of adult, of middle-class male, and of bank manager in so far as he learnt them. One can lump all the roles together and call them one, or one can separate them out, as one would if one wanted to say that he was performing the bank manager role adequately at any moment but that he displayed certain traits of speech or manner which were not accepted as characteristic of middle-class male adults. The succession of roles presents no difficulty. When he leaves his office the businessman may play the roles of a "sport" at the club, a father in the home, and a mason in the lodge throughout the course of an evening. In doing so he will be influenced by something we have not yet mentioned.

The roles in any society are, as we have seen, abstract patterns of conduct to which the actual conduct of people occupying the relevant statuses approximates. The members of a society, however, often formulate in their minds and in conversation verbalized versions of "ideal roles", which are patterns of conduct which "ought" to go with certain statuses.

In the case of statuses involving specialized skills the roles which we, as observers, abstract from the behaviour we witness may be extremely like that behaviour; that is to say, the range of variation in doing whatever it

is may be small. Furthermore, if we were to ask for a verbal account of the "ideal" performance, it might not be very different from the role we have abstracted or from the actual performance we have witnessed. In roles of a more general order, such as those of father or mother, son or daughter, this does not always hold. We watch fathers behaving as such and they all behave differently; there is, however, a certain general pattern of conduct which seems expected of fathers; this is the "role" we construct from observation. It may be, however, that the "ideal" father of whom they talk is nowhere to be seen. Nevertheless, the "ideal" role is not by any means without its influence. Fathers may be restrained from certain courses of action by thinking of the "ideal" father they "ought" to be.

The "ideal" roles may give rise to feeling of guilt in those who depart from them too far. But what the social psychologist has to bear in mind is that he must check his concepts of "roles" by observations of actual behaviour, and not rely on the verbalized version which may be far from the facts.

Finally it must be observed that statuses are reciprocal in the sense that the role of any status calls forth in response the role of some other status. The role of child elicits appropriate responses which are the roles of "other children of the same age", "older child", "younger child", "father", "mother", "adult", and so on. The role of employee has its reciprocal in the roles of employer, fellow-employee, student of industrial psychology, etc.

This knowledge of what to do and what to expect is what makes for smooth social living. It is, in fact, a version of the "frame of reference", which

we have met before.

One of the features of our own time is the indeterminacy and rapid changing of roles. Of children, of employees, and of public servants, one constantly hears the indignant cry: "One does not know what they will do next", followed by: "One can't say anything to them". To many people this is a distressing situation.

We come now to the third concept: basic personality.

We have so far given a formal analysis of culture, passing from actual conduct with its recurrent patterns to the positions from which these patterns radiate in the reciprocal interaction of roles. The "basic personality" is a rather more abstract model; it corresponds roughly with what one is trying to indicate by such expressions as "a typical Frenchman" or "a good Comanche". Every Frenchman is different from every other, so is every Comanche Indian, but there is some rather indefinite type of personality which is taken to be "normal", "right" and "proper" among the Comanche which is very different from any notion we might form of the "typical" Frenchman. "Basic personality structure," for Linton,⁽¹⁾ represents the constellation of personality characteristics which would appear to be congenial with the total range of institutions comprised within a given culture."

The concept was first used by Kardiner and Linton, and in their hands it is a tool for the analysis of cultures in the way which was indicated at the beginning of this chapter and which will be discussed later on. In addition to the "basic personality type", characteristic of a culture, we may also borrow

(1)In Kardiner, A. The Individual and his Society. Columbia. Univ. Press, 1939 p vi.

from Linton the notion of "status personality" which is a kind of consolidation of the status/role concept. The doctor occupies a status and has a role to play, but we expect him to be something more than a mere performer of the motions. We expect him to have a certain attitude towards his work and his patients and certain standards of professional conduct; such a complex makes up the "status personality" of the status of doctor.

The infant is faced with a system of statuses, some of which he must learn to occupy, and a "basic personality" type, in terms of which his education will unconsciously conspire to mould him. Before him lie certain status personalities which he must learn to accept.

So far we have shrunk from a definition of personality. We can accept the one given by Allport in his Personality⁽¹⁾ to the effect that: "Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment." The merit of this definition is that it combines inclusiveness with the feature of organization. For our purpose it is convenient to distinguish, however roughly, between those adjustments that are relatively specific to certain situations, and those which are more general and "come out" on all sorts of occasions. The appropriate adjustment to the demands of a skilled occupation, for example, or to those of an "unskilled" one, for a matter of that, are more specific than such general adjustments as go by the description of "aggressive", "sly", "anxious", "suspicious", and so on. The former are a matter of explicit training, the latter are the resultants of more

(1) Hold 1937. p 48

complex factors. In so far as one thing of a man's skills — manual, linguistic, athletic, etc. — as ingredients in his personality, it is quite clear that different cultures will produce different results in personality because they involve different sets of skills. But it is plausible to say that these skills which may require innate abilities, such as intelligence and manual aptitudes are relatively superficial to the "real" personality of their possessors. It is perfectly true that many "status personalities" involve general attitudes and ways of thought besides the specific performances their roles entail, but the distinction between the specific skills and general attitudes can be appreciated when we remember that not all civil servants are "typical" civil servants, while many people, not in the Civil Service, are.

The method adopted by societies for the training in special skills will vary from one culture to another, and it will partly depend upon the nature of the skills involved. and whether they are sacred or secret, or open to anyone to acquire. The subject will not be pursued here because we are more interested in the general attitudes and ways of thinking, as features of the personality which social intercourse influences. Two observations, however, must be made. If any skills are held to be sacred and if only a few are allowed to learn them, these facts and the method of imparting them, are likely to have an effect on the "general" personality of the initiates. They may be treated with reverence or avoidance, and they may feel themselves to have a power which others have not. Furthermore, as we shall see, the achievement of the status to which these skills belong may serve as an outlet for social deviates who have

not been able to acquire the accepted set of general personality traits.

The second point is this. Some simple skills, which may be all that are required for the majority of persons to live a normal life in a community, may be gradually taught to children as they become capable of carrying them out. Where this is the case there is no need for the status of "educator", at any rate for such skills. More important is the fact that the child can be given a place in the work of its family or kin. This may well induce a sense of responsibility which may be absent in children whose activities have nothing whatever to do with the serious work of the community. Not all primitive peoples seem to expect their children to undertake serious work at an early age, even when they can, but the imposition of such responsibilities can still be observed in remoter corners of our own urbanized society. Children of small farmers are often brought up to participate in the work of the farm. They are relied on to do such small but essential jobs as lie within their competence. One result of this is that they are treated seriously, and casual observation would seem to show that they do not suffer so much from those upheavals which used to be thought "natural" to the period of adolescence.

When, on the other hand, the sorts of things that adults do and the sorts of things they are expected to know are such that specialized training is required, the child is taken from its house for various periods, it enters a new and specially structured society for hours, almost every day or for months at a time, and thus social situations present themselves which cannot but make a difference to its personality. The things the children do

in such a culture are different from the things the adults do, and this contributes to the gulf between them. The way this tension manifests itself will, of course, vary with circumstances. The boy may be taught more up-to-date things than father knows. Father may be disgusted at his son's lack of progress. Pride, disappointment, encouragement, envy and nostalgia may colour the relation between children and parents in ways which are not likely to be found when the child passes slowly from a little inept grubbing to being entrusted with larger and larger tools, without having to leave the family hearth.

Thus the acquisition of a skill as such may not make a deep impression on a personality, but the circumstances in which it is acquired may be of significance.

INFANT TRAINING

Turning now to the training of infants with respect to more general traits we are faced with such a variety of cultures, basic personalities, and status personalities, and such an array of different family structures, kinship structures, statuses, expectations and assumptions, that it would require a great many volumes to bring together all the different ways of life that human being have produced. All we can do here is to consider certain very general principles which seem to emerge, indicating the sort of ways in which different set-ups are likely to be significant. This is not only a matter of

"academic" interest; it is of practical significance. If we consider some of the social "experiments" which humanity has unintentionally tried out, we may be better equipped for a study of our own "experiment" as it stands at present, and we may perhaps be tempted to experiment further, not by leaving the unintentional drift to follow its course, but with an intention to produce certain effects.

Now if you are moulding a piece of plasticine, the material is passive to your touch. When you are "moulding" a human infant this is by no means the case. You have to exploit its dynamic potentialities. Let us reduce them to the simplest statement: 1) there are bodily states of tension which demand release. The process of release gives pleasure; the consistent experience of release gives security. 2) There is a need for what may be called "social recognition". This may be derived from the attentiveness of other people with the release of primary tensions. Whether this need is derived or not, it is of major importance as an educational lever. 3) Certain bodily experiences are painful, the persistence of tension is unpleasing and the denial of goodwill is distressing. The infant may be calculated to make some response to such situations. Avoidance or aggression are possible responses, and there are certain round-about techniques, such as finding some substitute method of satisfying a need, or displacing a tendency from a disallowed objective to an allowed one, or developing a system of beliefs in which the unsatisfied tendencies are "projected" on to fictitious entities. The "entities" in this third technique may be stereotypes derived from real life or purely imaginary beings.

It is not suggested that the responses to pain or non-satisfaction which have been mentioned are an exhaustive list. They are merely examples of possible responses, all of which have an importance in this context.

It will be seen that if we put the tension-release system and the need for social recognition together, they provide a basis for reward-value, while the pains and non-satisfactions make some situations disrewarding. This word which has been coined for this purpose must be excused. The word "unrewarding" which is the contradictory of "rewarding" does not carry with it the implication of positive painfulness. The word "punishing" carries with it moral implication. The word "disrewarding" is intended to convey the notion of "off-putting".

From this a simple scheme emerges: situations, courses of action, persons, and things which are "rewarding" will tend to be sought, while those which have been found to be disrewarding will tend to be avoided, and other courses of action may be taken. With these simple concepts, when the general principles of learning are added, a considerable amount of human behaviour can be explained. Whether all human conduct can be reduced to such simple terms is very doubtful. The technique of reduction is as follows: take any objective sought by any human being and see whether, as you trace its origin, you require nothing more than the concepts mentioned above. Can you, that is to say, trace it back to certain primary tension-release systems together with the need for social recognition, and account for its specific character by means of the principles of learning, plus the mechanisms which are brought in

to action under circumstances of dis-reward? The alternative, of course, is that you must introduce some other dynamic principle, such, for instance, as what is sometimes called "Moral Sense". For example, suppose a man devotes himself to, say, the relief of the suffering of lepers or the improvement of the lot of criminal lunatics, is it ever the case that his conduct cannot be accounted for, without residue, in terms perhaps of his happy home-life, which has made him friendly disposed to other people, or his unhappy home-life, which has engendered such hatred that he has to behave with exaggerated solicitude in order to hide from himself and other people the raging storm that lies within? Or do you ever have to introduce some flash of moral awareness to account for it?

No decision upon the subject can be arrived at without a great deal of research. The point of mentioning it is that psychologists often ignore moral problems altogether and assume that because a very large range of human conduct can be explained with the simple scheme outlined above, moral decisions, when they get round to them, will prove equally amenable. This may, indeed, not be the case.

We now have to consider some of the situations which seem to be significant in the shaping of the personality. Again, not all the significant situations can be mentioned, but it is hoped that a selection may indicate some of the ways in which a culture exerts its first pressures. (1)

(1) For a list of key situations cf. Kardiner et al. Psychological Frontiers of Society, p. 26.

To begin with the new-born infant has to be tended, and this is done with varying degrees of solicitude, from one culture to another. "The Mundugamor women," Margaret Mead (1) tells us "actively dislike child-bearing, and they dislike children Mothers nurse their children standing up, pushing them away as soon as they are the least bit satisfied". The Alorese mothers, as described by Dr. Du Bois, leave their children after about fourteen days and go and work in the fields. Their tensions are intermittently relieved by anyone who happens to be at hand and can no longer stand the noise of the child crying. In the former case, though treated with hostility, the Mundugamor child can develop an aggressive snatching technique to get what it wants; in the latter it is so Kardiner (2) suggests, so overwhelmed by its tensions, and the intermittent and uncalculable nature of such release as it gets that it cannot form "effective action systems". The foundations are laid by the Mundugamors for an aggressive personality. The Alorese, however, who have no continuous emotional contact, grow up "anxious, suspicious, mistrustful, lacking in confidence (and) with no interest in the outer world". If this interpretation be correct it would appear that some coherent emotional treatment is a prerequisite for the development of responsiveness, leaving aside the nature -- aggressive or otherwise -- of the responses.

Affectionate and solicitous treatment would appear to pave the way for co-operation and a sense of security and personal value. There is, however, a possible danger. If dependency and passivity are overstressed the male may

(1) Mead, M. Male and Female. Gollancz, 1949, p 69.

(2) Psychological Functions of Society. p 169.

not be able to put up an effective struggle against his neighbours if they are aggressive. This is what is said to happen among the peaceable Arapesh.⁽¹⁾ The women are prepared for their role of motherhood by the way they were cherished as children. The men are not so well placed; the active sexual role does not come easy to them and they are at a disadvantage in their social and geographical environment.

Another factor, which some writers believe to be significant, is the degree of freedom of movement allowed. We are used to infants lying in their cots or prams, kicking their legs and waving their arms. Many American Indians, many Italians and Yugoslavs, are denied this freedom. They are, in various ways, swaddled. The evidence about the effect of swaddling is ambiguous. Much has to be taken into consideration:⁽²⁾ the degree of freedom allowed, the attitude of the swaddlers, and the amount of liberty from swaddling. Recently Geoffrey Gorer⁽³⁾ has attempted to deduce certain characteristics which are familiar to the reader of Russian works from the prevalence of swaddling in that country. The hypothesis is that the swaddling impedes movement, this gives rise to aggressive responses which are inhibited, and the nursing of such aggressiveness in the breast gives rise to a sense of guilt. Furthermore the alternation of freedom and unfreedom, when the child is undone and done up again, plays its part — so it is suggested — in building a

(1) Mead, M. *ibid*, p 67

(2) cf. Greenacre, P. "Infant Reaction to Restraint". *Am. J. of Orthopsychiatry*, 14, 1949. Abridged Version in *Personality*. (Ed) Kluckhohn, C., p 390.

(3) Gorer, G. *The People of Great Russia*. Cresset Press, 1949.

somewhat explosive character.

Clearly the influence of swaddling, as with methods of feeding, must be taken in conjunction with other factors, and more research is required into, for example, the personal qualities of Russians who have not been swaddled, before we are able to assess its influence.

Another element in child care, and this time one about which we have considerable clinical evidence, is the training it receives in the control of its (sphincters. Proficiency in this control is expected at different ages in different societies, and the attitude towards the process of urination and defaecation also vary. In our culture, or, rather, in many of our sub-cultures, the topic is one which arouses strong feelings of disgust and it prompts all sorts of avoidance-reactions. Such attitudes make cleanliness discipline a matter of importance in the relationship between parent and child, which transcends the social importance of the control itself. So far as the latter is concerned, sphincter control is one of the child's first essays in social responsibility. The pleasures which it gets from its bodily functions have to be restricted to certain times and places, and the child is the only person who can do this. Here is an act for which he can be blamed. It is obvious, therefore, that if he is expected to achieve self-control at a very early age, and if his lapses are followed by severe treatment, a diminution of self confidence is likely to result.

All this is made the more significant when the whole subject is approached in a heightened emotional atmosphere. On the one hand the child

may be besought to produce; and its performance is often referred to as its "duty". On the other hand its productions are regarded with agitation and disgust, particularly when they appear in the wrong place. Now if we accept the hypothesis that the reactions of the infant are to be thought of in adult terms, it is obvious that the situation is full of possibilities. The response may be one of obstinate refusal to give what is demanded; it may be that an exaggerated regard for cleanliness, tidiness, accuracy is generated as a kind of countermeasure to the primary interest in the abominated thing; it may be that the child, dimly apprehending the sensibilities of adults, realizes that in untimely urination it has a weapon which it can use against them. Now the psycho-analysts ⁽¹⁾ hold that these responses tend to become generalized and form permanent components of the personality. If this is so, then the way in which a culture handles the problem of sphincter control is relevant to the type of personality which is produced by it.

Before proceeding to other, and rather more obvious, ways in which "culture" shapes "personality", a possible source of misunderstanding must be removed. Each infant is influenced in its subsequent development by the particular treatment he has received from his particular parents. His feeding his freedom or lack of it, and his training in control of his natural functions are specific to him and have worked upon his own peculiar constitution. All that is meant by saying that "cultural influences" are at work is: (1) that the treatment he has received is very wide-spread among the members of the society to which his own parents belong, and (2) that such treatment is deemed

by such persons to be within the range of treatments which they regard as acceptable. This is evidenced by verbal expressions of disapproval at treatment which lies outside the accepted range, and expression of approval, or the mere taking-for-granted, of treatment within it. There is no thing called "culture" which constitutes an additional force.

CHILDHOOD

The next social influence to be noted is the range of social relations open to the child as it grows up and becomes mobile. This again, varies enormously, and we can only consider the sort of effect which such variety may have.

To begin with, in our cultures the infant is usually brought up by two people, its mother and father, and these are almost the only adults from whom the satisfaction of its needs can come. Now the Samoan children enjoy a much less restricted range of adult attention. It is true that there are more people to order them about, but if they are uncomfortable with one set of adults they can go to another. "Few children," says Margaret Mead (1) "live continuously in one household, but are always testing out other possible residences." So that: "No Samoan child, except the taupo (a girl destined to be a ceremonial hostess), or the thoroughly delinquent, ever has to deal with a feeling of being trapped. There are always relations to whom

(1) Coming of Age in Somoa. Penguin Books, 1943, p 32

one can flee."

Among the Marquesans, as described by Linton,⁽¹⁾ and analysed by Kardiner, there is a shortage of women. The result is that a household is liable to consist of a head and his wife and a group of "secondary husbands" whom she has brought with her. The children are not welcomed by the women because they interfere with their sexual lives. It is the group of "fathers" who keep an eye on them. They seem to know who their actual fathers are, but this matters very little; they are dependent indiscriminately on all their mother's "husbands". This, again, as with the Samoan, gives rise to a diffuse dependency. If one "father" does not do what you want, you try another. Interestingly enough, the same course of action is applied to the ancestor-gods. If your offerings have not had the desired effect, it is not because you are wicked, but because the God is inefficient; ⁽²⁾ you go elsewhere with your presents.

In both cases, Samoan and Marquesan, the disciplinary technique of demanding a sacrifice as the price of love and protection is excluded. This device, the establishment of the principle "if I do this, Mother (or Father) will (or will not) love me", requires a more intense and concentrated emotional relationship than is found in either of these cultures, or in any culture in which the father and mother have not got the monopoly of protection and care, with which to force compliance.

Thus, the range and nature of adult contacts is a matter of importance

(1) Kardiner, A. The individual and His Society. Columbia Un. Press, 1939, p 137 f.

(2) Ibid., p 211

in personality development. So, too, is position in the family, though the significance of this will vary, in turn, with the general accessibility of companions outside the circle of siblings. Every child, in a household of legitimate children of the same parents (the possible situations which can arise if we include illegitimate children, and children of different spouses are here ignored for the sake of brevity and not because they are unimportant), is either the only child, the eldest of a number, the youngest of a number or an intermediate if the number is more than two. And every child is separated by a certain distance in age from his older or younger siblings if he has any. All these possible positions must make a difference. "There is probably no position in the family circle which does not involve as a consequence of its own peculiar nature certain problems of adjustment". (1) The positions of an only child, eldest, or youngest are different, and the kind of treatment and range of contacts which apply in each of these positions are different.

The nature of the difference, however, must depend on the culture. In the first place there is a well-known difference in the value placed upon children in terms of their sex. If girl children are socially illesteemed, the treatment of a first-born girl child is likely to be different from that given to a girl who follows a series of boys. Again, among the Marquesan, "the eldest child of either sex, or the child who was adopted to take the position of the eldest, becomes the official head of the household from the moment of birth or arrival" (2) This situation places all younger children in a markedly subor-

(1) Goodenough, F. L. and Leahy, A. M. "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships upon the Development of Personality." J. of Gener. Psych. 34 p. 45

(2) Individual and His Society. p 154.

dinate position vis-a-vis the eldest sibling. Thus no supra-cultural generalizations about birth-order can be made. In America a considerable volume of work has been done on the influence of birth-order upon social behaviour. Much of it is conveniently summarized by Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb. (1) The "Individual Psychologists", followers of Adler, have exploited the possibilities of inferiority which a family circle consisting of more than one child presents. (2) The results of investigation are often inconclusive and the results of one investigation frequently conflict with the results of others. This does not mean that birth-order is a negligible factor, it means that its effects are not uniform for every position. In the life of the individual they may be of vital importance.

As an example of the way in which cultural factors may operate in this matter, we may consider an unpublished piece of research by J. P. Lees on the subsequent careers of fifty miners who attended Nottingham University College for two days a week. When the data are analysed in terms of birth-order, it appears that an unexpectedly high proportion of those who availed themselves of the opportunity were eldest. Of them, some did conspicuously well afterwards, others returned to the pit. The remarkable thing is that the siblings of those who did well had almost all got out of the typical occupation of miners' families — mining for the boys and domestic duties for the girls — while in the case of those who returned to the pit this was not the case. There is no reason to suppose that family intelligence accounts for this, and

(1) op. cit., p 348

(2) cf. Wexberg. E. Individual Psychology. Allen and Unwin, 1930, p.185.

Lees offers a social-psychological explanation. Mining, at the time when the men were offered their two day a week course, was an ill-thought-of occupation. The eldests, finding their position of importance jeopardized by the arrival of siblings, compensated by going "to college"; that is why there were so many of them. Those whose siblings had remained in the ill-thought-of occupation did not have to do anything more than this; their superiority was unchallenged; they had been "to college" and they could go back to the mine. The others had to do something better. Going "to college" was not enough; they had to put forward an even greater effort to ensure their need for independent superiority.

The "intermediates", on the other hand were in a different case. They had enjoyed the importance of the youngest and the relative unimportance of an intermediate position. Their very unimportance in the family made them look outside for backing, and a high proportion of them did achieve some improvement in their status through distinguishing themselves in group activities such as Local Government and Trade Unionism. (1)

The numbers in this inquiry are small, but it illustrates the factors which have to be taken into account in future research. The conduct of the eldest in this context is determined by: (1) the status and role of "eldest" in a mining family, and (2) the fact that mining and domestic occupations were,

(1) I am indebted to Mr. J. P. Lees, Lecturer in Social Philosophy at Nottingham University for permission to quote from his research.

at a certain time, considered of low value. If either of these were otherwise, the situation would be radically changed. The same is true of the intermediates. From a formal point of view all "intermediates" have, by definition, been youngests and then displaced. Their status must, of course, be cultural ly determined and may vary from one culture to another. The interesting question remains: in our culture do they all tend to find solace in hanging on to a person or a group of persons outside the family circle? The intermediate position has been neglected by investigators, and only further research will throw light on this not unimportant problem.

As time goes on the infant grows into a mobile child and comes into active relationship with other children. The opportunities of such contact will vary from one community to another, and, in large-scale societies, from one class to another. Sometimes they live a comparatively care-free life, sometimes, as in Samoa, some of them—the little girls—have duties put upon them of looking after children younger than themselves. As usual the range of possibilities is enormous, and it is difficult to see in detail how different systems of inter-child relationship make their specific contributions to the personalities in process of creation. Certain formal changes, however, would seem to be brought about in this context.

The infant in a restricted home circle, or surrounded by a number of potentially helpful adults, is dependent. He makes his claims, he succeeds or suffers rebuffs, he develops techniques of holding out his arms, or howling, or snatching to get what he wants, but the relationship between him and

others is unequal. Among siblings too the relationship is unequal, and depends upon the position of each. It is when he meets children of his own age, who can make no demands on him and on whom he makes no demands, that he experiences the full blast of equality, with its independence and its responsibilities.

Piaget, ⁽¹⁾ indeed, traces a sense of moral responsibility to the development of children's relations with one another. His main data came from the study of a group of Swiss children playing a game. The attitude towards the rules seems to change as the child grows out of its readiness to accept them as sacrosanct. and reaches a stage at which the rules are regarded as necessary conveniences for the playing of the game, but alterable and "breakable" if it would on occasion be "fair" to do so. This notion of "fair" presupposes an appreciation of another person's position. It may, of course, be learnt in the family circle, but it is fairly obvious that it is sharpened in a group of children each fending for him or herself, and yet learning that regard must be paid to the interests of others if one's own interests are to be regarded. In fact the child becomes aware of "other people", and in so doing it is hardly too much to say that he participates in the child sub-culture of his society, with its standards, its approval, its disapproval, its prestiges and its heroes.

In the family circle in which, particularly if a restricted one, a child has to renounce much that he would like to do in order to get the goodwill of

(1) Piaget, J. Moral Judgment of the Child. Kegan Paul, 1932.

its parents, restrictive mechanisms are incorporated. It is sometimes suggested that these restrictive mechanisms, implanted at an early age, are almost the only ones of any importance. This is clearly not so. Whether these mechanisms are formulated in the dramatic language of a forbidding "super_ego", or whether they are thought of as an acquired and habitualized set of inhibitions, they are continually undergoing modification and addition. The earliest are surprisingly persistent and cover a very much wider range of activities than was "rationally" intended, sometimes making all pleasure or anything that comes to be associated with sex a matter of anxiety. But the safeguards of goodwill which one learns and makes part of oneself in one's effort to stand well with one's co-equals in age, and, even more with those a little older, add their quota to the inhibitive system.

It is for this reason that more attention should be paid to differences in the sub-cultures of children in different social classes in our own community. One would suppose that children who meet in the street to play would be likely to develop a different system of social manipulation and restraints from that which would be developed in a world of arranged parties supervised by adults. This only concerns what we might call the informal and spontaneous social relations between children. When one considers the formal educational system with the opportunities which it affords for inter-child relationships there can be no doubt about the part they play in personality making. Indeed many aspects of our educational system are deliberately designed to make a mark on the personality of the children subjected to it. There is segregation

early. This contrasts with our methods, with the possible exception of remote rural areas, as has been suggested above. With us the child normally participates but little in the life of adults and therefore has responsibility thrust upon him unprepared. We train children to respectful dependence on elders, which means the playing of a role that has to be unlearned when they grow up. It is not surprising that some people find the change-over more than they can manage.

The same is true of our culture-patterning of sex. In infancy, in childhood, and in adolescence it is "dirty", in young-man-hood and young-womanhood it is regrettable, in marriage it suddenly becomes a "joy". It is not surprising that when the time for enjoyment comes, many of the partners are ill-conditioned for it: they find it difficult to unlearn all they have been taught.

DISCIPLINARY METHODS

In all this process of social-interchange by means of which a child's personality is slowly created in a form more or less congenial to the statuses he will fill and the institutional patterns in which he will participate, some of his spontaneous impulses will have proved disrewarding. When this happens he either has to give them up or "inhibit" them, or he has to find round-about ways of satisfying them, or he has to run the risk of the disreward if he allows them free rein. In point of fact somehow or other almost all members of societies manage to establish within them a method of control which seems



of the sexes, or deliberate non-segregation; there are "purity", "honour", and sportsmanship"; there are the "perfect system", the "house system", and the morning assembly", with or without an "act of worship". All these are devised as techniques of moulding personality. The difficulty is that we know very little about how they work; we know very little about the boy-culture or girl-culture that is precipitated by these "systems" and "ideals". Casual conversation would lead one to suppose that the little pitchers are not always shaped quite as the potter intends, and we have next to no knowledge about the working of different systems in other cultures, with the possible exception of the "dating" system in America.

In this matter, then, of the effect of inter-child relationships on the differential shaping of personality we have to confess deep ignorance.

There is, however, a point of interest raised by Ruth Benedict.⁽¹⁾ She points out that in some primitive societies a child is regarded as having the same kind of responsibility as the adult only not being able to do so much. They are expected to do things like shut doors if asked without anyone go int to their aid, though they will not do it as quickly as someone older. Again, in some societies children are expected to joke and tease certain adults on an equality and with the freedom expected of grown up people, while submission is positively disapproved of by many American Indians. The point of this is that at a very early age they are practising what they will be doing when they are grown up and a sense of responsibility is inculcated very

(1) "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning." *Psychiatry*, Vol. I, 1938, p. 161 also in Kluckhohn, C. (ed) *Personality*. p 414.

to work automatically.

Looked at from the point of view of the society, it may be said to "discipline" its children through the parents and other relatives who have disciplinary responsibility. The question is: how is this done? We are familiar with a theory that we "introject" our version of our parents and that this, in the shape of the "super-ego" keeps watch over the impulses which surge up from our instinctual nature. Either (1) the super-ego holds such an impulse at bay in which case we are completely unaware in every respect of its existence, or (2) a disapproved impulse comes through, is executed, and we feel specific guilt for what we have done, or (3) the conflict is such that, although we remain unaware of the nature of the impulse, we feel anxious and guilty either in a diffused and unattached form or attached to something other than the peccant impulse. This is a very simplified form of the hypothesis, and no account is taken of various manoeuvres to avoid anxiety or otherwise get out of the difficulty. Nor is account taken of the range of items which come under the ban of the super-ego — a range which clinical research has shown to be unexpectedly large. What interests us here is "guilt", and the terms which go with it: "right" and "wrong". The importance of this lies in the fact that some cultural anthropologists and others tell us that our method of discipline is only one of many, and a deficient one at that.

Thus Kardiner (1) writes of the Kwakiutl: "Although sense of shame is

(1) Individual and His Society, p 119.

inordinately sensitive, sense of guilt seems to be lacking," and then observes that the Marquesan "had a horror of being laughed at, and aversion which was a powerful factor in maintaining the mores of the society, for the non-conformist was certain to be subjected to ridicule".⁽¹⁾

Erikson, ⁽²⁾ who compares two American Indian tribes with contemporary America says: "Children are largely educated by older children, and are kept in check by fear of tangible ridicule rather than by the vague discomfort of guilt feelings. They are encouraged to be virtuous by the promise of concrete and universal prestige points. On the plains, at least, no threat of violence or abandonment estranges parent and child, no talk of sinfulness, body, and self."⁽³⁾ Similarly, the Henrys report that "Among the Pilagá (Indians) there is no strong sense of guilt and no institutionalized support for guilty feelings. This does not mean that they do not experience guilt feelings, but rather that those feelings are different in some respects from what is experienced in our culture Self-punishment and self-accusation do not occur in any of the Pilagá material." ⁽⁴⁾

It is, however, Margaret Mead who has explored this question most carefully. In two chapters ⁽⁵⁾ of Kluckhohn's *Personality*, from which some of the above material has been taken, she contrasts other methods of

(1) *Individual and His Society*, p 177

(2) Erikson, E. H. in Kluckhohn, C. (ed) *Personality*, Chapter 14.

(3) *ibid.* p 195.

(4) *Ibid.* p 238 (author's italics). (5) Chapt. 36 & 37.

disciplining with our own. The Samoan baby is simply removed from the scene by its child-nurse, and therefore learns: "If I am to be let alone and allowed to stay where I like, I must keep quiet, sit still, and conform to the rules," which is just what the ceremony-loving Samoan does. "Obviously," says Dr. Mead, "in such a setting there is no room for guilt." The Balinese baby is continually put through the right motions, quietly pulled from places in which it should not be, and occasionally, if very naughty, terrified by its guardian with simulated fear on her part. "From all this the child learns that a pleasant mood and cultural conformity to fixed patterns occur together, and meets any possibility of deviation from that pattern with vague, uncertain distrust." Finally the vigorous Iatmuls who expect their children to be as wilful as they are, learn: "If I do not assert myself, I will get nothing; and if I anger other people I will get slapped; and if I temporarily escape from being slapped, hunger and mosquitoes will drive me back again within range of retribution."

How different, Dr. Mead's point is, from us. "Our own super-ego system of character-formation appears as a special and rather complicated development," and, again, "Comparative studies ... demonstrate that this type of character — in which the individual is reared to ask first, not "Do I want it?" "Am I afraid?" or "Is it the custom?" but "Is this right or wrong?" — is a very special development, characteristic of our own culture and of a very few other societies. It is dependent upon the parents personally administering the culture in moral terms, standing to the children as a responsible representative of right choices, and punishing or rewarding the child

in the name of the right."

The special utility of the incorporation of the parental image is recognized by Mead and by Kardiner. (1) Both agree that it functions when nobody is about.

The importance of this whole matter can hardly be overestimated. We can see it from two points of view. Mead suggests that the establishment of what we can call the "super-ego", modelled upon the infantile notion of the parents, will work well enough in a very slowly changing society, because there is very little conflict between the parental ideals incorporated by the infants and the sort of life which they and their generation will live. If, however the standards and skills of the younger generation differ markedly from those of the older one (and of course this is more likely to be the case with immigrants in America, as we have so frequently been told) then a conflict may arise between what they have absorbed from their parents, and what their own age-group approves of. The disciplinary sanction of guilt conflicts in its incidence with the age-group sanction of social shame. We may, in our society, assume that young people have acquired the "guilt" mechanism, while in fact this has been partially supplanted. If this were the case, it would have an obvious bearing on the treatment of delinquents.

The other point of view is that of Erich Fromm. In his *Man for Himself* (2) Fromm takes the line that the "guilt" control, springing as it

(1) *Psychological Frontiers of Society*, p 153

(2) Kegan Paul, 1949

does from an authoritarian régime, is bad and stands in the way of the creation of a many-sided and satisfied personality.

This brings us to the verge of ethical theory and this is not the place to make an excursion therein. One thing, however, must be said, and that is that whatever theory eventually emerges we must allow for what may be called "second order" moral judgments. We may, for instance, have a first order moral judgment to the effect that premarital sexual intercourse is "wrong". Contemplating this, however, we may judge it "a good thing" or "a bad thing" that people should make that judgment. The problem for the student of ethics and, for a matter of that, the student of social psychology is: how do we come to make such "second-order" judgments, and any final theory must account for the indubitable fact that we do?

Here we shall confine ourselves to "first-order" judgment.

Before attempting to disentangle the problem of alternative sanctions, there is one point which does not receive enough attention. We tend to concentrate on "temptation", the impulse or desire to do something against which we have acquired a rejecting attitude, but it is surely true that many of the actions which a society deprecates may be as it were excluded from the purview of many of its members by the course of approved action which they have incorporated. Cowardice might be strongly disapproved of by the Indian "brave". This does not necessarily mean (though occasionally it may) that he is constantly fighting against a temptation to behave in a cowardly way. Save under dire stress, when his controls may come into play, cowardice is simply ruled

out by his positive fighting spirit. Temptation to embezzle may occasionally present itself to a clerk, and then fear, shame or guilt may not play their part, but for the most part the clerical role excludes the "temptation" altogether. Thus much not-doing of that which is forbidden is excluded by the very doing of that which is permitted.

However, that of course does not dispose of the question. Broadly speaking it will be agreed that social discipline is effected by rewards and disrewards. The primary rewards are release of tension, pleasant stimulation, and enhancement of self-feeling, the primary disrewards are continuance of tension, painful stimulation and diminution of self-feeling. The child develops techniques for ensuring rewards, techniques which may include the acceptance of certain disrewards; it also develops techniques for safeguarding itself against disrewards. Among these techniques are a registration of the signs of reward and of the warnings of disreward. Here we must distinguish between the nature of the rewards and disrewards, and the interpretation put upon the conduct rewarded or disrewarded.

Supposing you have a society in which the disreward took the form of pain or threats of spirits who would cause pain, then that which brings pain will be regarded in future with apprehension, and such acts and their associated accompaniments, whatever they may be, will be avoided as we avoid a live wire or a hot surface. They are not wicked, but dangerous.

The nature of the disreward is pain, but the problem about which we know all too little is the interpretation put upon the type of thing which is

now thought of as dangerous. If pain or threats are widely used we can easily see that a generally apprehensive attitude may develop — as seems to be the case with the Balinese. At the same time there may be a certain amount of selection as, for example, in some of our own sub-cultures. When mother says: "If you do that the cops will get you," the "that" made dangerous by the threat gets linked with other "that's" similarly charged with danger in actual experience, and also, presumably by hearing other people talking with bated breath, with other "that's" which have not been experienced. Exactly how this generalizing and spreading of the dangerous is accomplished we do not know.

It would be possible to establish — indeed, it is done — a system of controls based upon fear, without "guilt" coming in at all. The weakness of such a system would be that if the pain did not always follow the act which is to be eliminated, or if the pain did not outweigh the reward, then the subject would be liable to be prepared from time to time to take the risk.

Much the same may be said of ridicule. This makes use of the need for a sense of worth as its lever. The effective jeer is deflatory and not mere laughter. In this case, however, the attitude of other people is more important; they are not mere sources of danger, but potential sources of good will. What will be important, therefore, is the range of persons whose jeers are important — jeers, as such, need have no effect. In a relatively small society, and this seems to be the case with many primitive communities, ridicule may be a satisfactory method. The difficulties of accounting for generalization remain with us, but at the same time ridicule would appear to

have this advantage over pain: the subject shares, as it were, in the ridicule he receives. Having met with jeers as a response, he "takes on the attitude of the other", and becomes capable of jeering at himself, so that he can be a fool in his own eyes. This clearly extends the range of conduct over which ridicule may operate. At the same time the puzzling problem of generalization, to which reference has been made, is a matter worthy of further research, not only into its mechanism, but into its scope. The question is: are fear and ridicule more specific in their incidence than the other methods to which we must turn? If, for instance, a child is laughed at for masturbating and laughed at for his preliminary sexual play with the opposite sex, does this mean that all sex is made ridiculous, and therefore something to be shunned? One would guess not, but there is very little evidence either way.

In our society we use ridicule, pain and threats, and the extent to which these devices are used varies from one part of our culture to another. We do, however, make use of another method. In the first place with us the child is solely dependent upon the mother and father in most cases. Sometimes the mother is the cherisher, the father the disciplinarian, sometimes both are both. Now a simple account of the story is that when the mother, forcibly or by withholding her rewards, frustrates her child's enjoyment, the child responds with antagonism. This is tantamount to a death-wish and therefore conflicts with the child's love and with its needs. The death-wish is repressed and when it arises again to the surface is res

ponded to by a sense of guilt. The sense of guilt, which subsequently gets tacked on to other things, is primarily a specific feeling caused by the hostility to the mother.

This theory is hardly acceptable, because one cannot understand why this specific feeling should be generated under circumstances in which fear of retaliation would be the "natural" response. However, the theory does pose the question: why guilt? Some may reply that the feeling of guilt is the "natural" response to a recognition that what we have done is really wrong. This, however, is unsatisfactory, too, because there is no general agreement about the wrongness of all the acts or thoughts or desires about which people feel guilty.

Some light may be shed upon the matter by the following reflection. Suppose a child does that which it should not or refuses to do that which it should, and its mother gives it a sharp box on the ears or smack on the bottom. A wail may be set up, but it is likely to refrain from doing what it is not supposed to do, and possibly, with reluctant and rebellious gesture, it may do what is being demanded. Let us assume that on the whole the mother feeds, comforts, and generally provides rewards, then the episode may be what is called "a lesson", and it may have the desired after-effects. The question of an aftermath of "repressed" hostility we will leave aside. What is important for our purpose is that the child notes the angry face, the raised voice, the uplifted hand as danger signals. They portend a sharp pain, but not necessarily anything so portentous as loss of love.

Now we all know that this is not the only thing that happens by any means. Very often the mother puts on a special expression, evincing shock-
edness, amazement at such conduct, disapproval, sorrow, and conveying a
sense of withdrawal from contamination. At the same time and in a special
voice she says things like: "That's naughty" or "That's wrong" — Mummy
won't love you if you do things like that". All this solemnity makes the
fence not merely dangerous but enormous. Now in a situation in which "Mum
my" and "Daddy" are the only protectors, this is a serious matter. We have
all experienced or witnessed it. We all know the heavily charged atmos-
phere when Father has taken a misdemeanour seriously, rather than
merely irritably. Angry, of course he is, but not merely angry, as with
a child he "cops" making finger-marks on the newly painted door and just
cuffs in a rage, but scandalized at such things being possible in his children;
in fact, he looks "grave".

The suggestion put forward is that this special demeanour on the part
of adults is what makes the difference between the risky and shaming on the
one hand and the "wicked" or "wrong" or "naughty" on the other.

Just as the child takes the jeering audience into himself and thus can
shame himself, so he takes the sinister figures of his morally outraged pa-
rents into himself and is horrified at his own wickedness. There is no con-
flict between what is said here and the psychoanalytic doctrine of the super
ego, with its uncounscious threats, and its excessive hostility, partly deri-
ved from the child's own hostility and its misconception of the parents' "real"

attitude. What is being suggested is that this formulation applies in its fullness to situations in which (1) the child is completely dependent upon a small number of adults, and (2) is addressed in this peculiarly portentous way.

What is left unexplained, it must be admitted, is the origin of this special attitude to the infringement of rules. It is not wholly impossible that it might be traced back to a primitive response to the "sacred" as distinct from the "profane", in fact to that specific awe-ful response to anything apprehended as charged with magic from which religion may have its source. Once the original response is made and attached to forbidden conduct, it can be passed on from one generation to another in the way suggested above.

There remains the important question of what is learnt to be so forbiddingly forbidden. The conduct itself, no doubt, and conduct like it. But how is the conduct presented, besides being presented as bad? Or, rather, what general aspect of the conduct stands out? Two aspects are often picked upon: pleasure and/or obedience, though this does not exhaust the list.

We have to bear in mind the obvious fact that the infant learns only by actual here and now checking in a specific social situation, and we do not know how either of these two aspects (particularly the first) is singled out from the total configuration. Somehow or other pleasure is sometimes selected, and all that is pleasurable is tarnished with doubtfulness, and has to be paid for with pain, because the sequence pleasure-pain has been followed by the rehabilitation of "forgiveness". The "obedience" factor is, perhaps, easier to account for because it is verbalized: "This is wrong, be

cause I told you not to." It is obvious that stress on obedience will vary from one society to another as is illustrated by the contrasting structure of the Marquesan and the Tanala; in the latter the obedience of the younger sons is essential to the economy.

We may say then, by way of summarizing this rather lengthy discussion that as the infant grows up, it becomes "socialized" by acquiring a set of controls which aim at preventing its doing what the adults and its contemporaries dislike. It may learn that such conduct is dangerous, or ridiculous or wicked. The stress varies from culture to culture, and within any large scale culture from one sub-culture to another. Some rely on danger, all use ridicule to some extent, we use both, and "sin" in addition. Cultures also vary in the content of the forbidden, though all conduct which prejudices social living is likely to be banned by all societies. Furthermore, when a plurality of disciplinary techniques are employed, some conduct is controlled by fear, some by ridicule and some by "guilt". Variation in the incidence of these techniques is of great importance for the understanding of delinquency.

Whatever be the technique adopted by a society the majority of its members will acquire its restraints and seek after the rewards it provides for doing what it encourages and not doing what it penalizes. General forms of behaviour which are acceptable or the reverse will vary, but all socialization involves some measure of renunciation.

F R U S T R A T I O N

This brings us to the important matter of the response to such frustration. The simple answer to this is that frustration causes aggression and per contra, that all aggression is caused by frustration. This hypothesis has been worked out by J. Dollard and his collaborators in Frustration & Aggression (1) in which they bring together a considerable amount of evidence to support their principle. The matter is, unfortunately, not as simple as it appears, but the principle is one of great heuristic and practical value. Certainly, where frustration occurs aggression is likely to follow in some form or another, and where hostility is manifest we do well to look for a frustrating situation as its basis. This implies that hostility may be reduced if frustration is curtailed.

We must, however, first consider what is meant by "aggression". All creatures in pursuit of their ends tend forcibly to manipulate the means that will lead to them. This necessarily involves a certain expenditure of effort, a certain display of force, and, on occasion, a certain amount of destruction. A dog crunching a bone or a man "attacking" his dinner are destructive and forceful but they are not necessarily behaving in a hostile fashion. Children, too, in their exploration pull things to pieces, so do puppies and parrots. Again, this may be "aggressive" in one sense, but not in another. Furthermore people of a vigorous constitution will be likely to be more forceful in

(1) Eng. Edit. Kegan Paul, 1944

their efforts to achieve their ends and this may well be accompanied by what can plausibly be called "violence", but not necessarily "hostility".

{ The point is that forceful manipulation need not imply anger and resentment and therefore many acts that might be called "aggressive" spring from a lively pursuit of ends and not from the desire to work off aggression. We should perhaps go even further, and exclude from "hostility" such "aggressive" acts as children snatching what they want from other people. The "attack" may be hostile as well, but it may be mere determination.

It is worth noting that the minute records of child behaviour, referred to by Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, show that "children who had the highest and most stable scores for sympathetic behaviour on the playground were unsympathetic or distinctively aggressive when their ego was threatened, when they were teased or misunderstood or put into inferior positions."

(1) In fact a great deal of forceful inter-child behaviour is part of the process of developing social awareness, in which the child becomes sensible of other children as fellow-sufferers, play-mates, competitors, and obstacles. It is not denied that aggressive acts are performed, but one must recognize their functions as fleeting social responses which play their part in the process of social adjustment (2). E.H. Green (3) who studied friend

(1) op. cit., p 539

(2) cf. Murphy, L.B. Social Behaviour and Child Personality. Columbia Univ. Press. 1937

(3) "Friendship and Quarrels among Pre-school Children," Child Development 4. p 237. Quoted: Kimball Young. Personality and Prob. Adj. K. P. 1947.

ships and quarelling among young children, reports that it was the friends who quarrelled most, not the less friendly.

Aggression, then, in the sense in which it interests us as a response to frustration is not mere forceful manipulation. It is, as Dollard and his collaborators say, "an act whose goal response is injury to an organism or organism surrogate". To this we may add the undercurrent of hostility which marks it out from other violent behaviour.

Ordinary everyday experience is enough to show that hostile aggression is an extremely common response to frustration. If nothing else serves you kick a stone or the offending mechanical object, and you may even "kick yourself". In experimental studies the same kind of thing is observed. In the "authoritarian" régimes of Lewin, Lippit and White's experiment, (1) some of the boys responded with overt aggression, others displayed aggression when they changed over to democracy. In the experiment of Barker, Dembo and Lewin, which is described below, aggression was one of the responses to the frustrating situation. Sears, Havland and Miller (2) subject six subjects to twenty four hours' sleep deprivation and during that time they were frustrated in all sorts of ways. They were not allowed to smoke, the games were "forgotten", and food which was promised did not arrive. The subjects, as might be expected, got "nasty". Overt aggression by violence was inhibited by their training, but their remarks showed well enough their

(1) p. 79 above.

(2) Sears, Robert R., Havland, Carl I. and Miller, Neal E. "Minor Studies of Aggression". J. of Psychology, 1940. IX, 277. cf. Readings in Social Psychol.

state of mind, One of them drew a page full of pictures depicting a man being hanged, a torso spilling entrails, and a head and shoulders dripping blood. When asked what these atrocities represented, he replied: "Psychologists."

More evidence of displaced aggression comes from an experiment of Miller and Bugelski (1) who promised thirty-one young men in a camp that they should go to the theatre, and then cancelled the engagement. In this mood of frustration the subjects were asked to rate Japanese and Mexicans (this was before the war). They had already done so before the "frustrating" experience, and the score of unfavourable characteristics showed a notable increase.

The experimental evidence besides generally confirming our expectation, contains one or two items of interest, which are not so obvious. The experiment of Barker, Dembo and Lewin (2) has been mentioned above. In it a group of children were given play material which could either be used constructively or just fiddled with. From their methods of handling a scale of constructiveness was devised. In the frustrating situation a partition in the room was then removed, disclosing the play material mixed up with a mass of fascinating toys which the children proceeded to explore. They were encouraged to do this until they became absorbed in their play and then the experimenter picked up the original play material, whisked the children off to

(1) Miller, Neal E. and Bugelski, Richard. "Minor Studies of Aggression. J. of Psychology, 1948, 25, p 437.

(2) Barker, R. G. Dembo, T. Lewin, K. "Frustration and Aggression". Univ. of Iowa. Studies in Child Welfare, 1941, XVIII, No. 1.

the other part of the room, and down came a wire grille fastened by a padlock, shutting them out from paradise.

Not unnaturally some of them displayed aggression when they were invited to go on with their dull old "constructive play". Their play became very much less constructive; that was one result. When the experiment was repeated with pairs of children by Wright,⁽¹⁾ another point emerged. The pairs of children who were strong friends did not suffer so much in loss of construction, and were more emboldened than the "weak" friends to take such hostile action against the experimenter as was taken. It may be that the fact that they could "let off steam" enabled them to go on with their cooperative play.

The same kind of effect was noticed in French's experiment with organized and unorganized groups, to which reference has already been made.⁽²⁾ They were asked to solve problems which could not be solved in the time allotted. The "organized" groups who were friends already, let off steam by blaming one another, and this they were able to do without risk, simply because they were friends. It has also been found by other experimenters that overt aggression is often accompanied by superior perform -

(1) Wright, M. E. "Constructiveness of Play as Affected by Group Organization and Frustration". *Character and Personality*, 1942, XI, p 40, and "The Influence of Frustration upon the Social Relations of Young Children". *ibid.*, 1943, XII, p 111. cr. also Combined account by Barker, Dembo, Lewin and Wright. *Readings in Social Psychology*, p 283.

(2) p. 52

(3) Himmelweit, Hilda. "Frustration and Aggression" in *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*. Ed. T. H. Pea. Hutchinson, 1940. p 177.

ance. (1)

Finally we must refer to an experiment by Rosenzweig (2) in which he gave a difficult intelligence test to two groups of adults. One group was invited to co-operate in a piece of research and it was impressed on them that their performance would in no way redound to their discredit, while the others were given the opposite impression. The frustrating element was their inability to complete the test, but the response of each group was different. The first group exhibited a persistent need to finish the task, the second were what he called "egodefensive". Significantly enough, when asked afterwards to remember what they had done, the former remembered more of the unfinished tasks, the latter more of the finished ones.

Rosenzweig (3) has made a further contribution to the subject by noting the objectives against which aggression is directed.

He classifies people in three groups: "extra-punitive", "intropunitive" and "impunitive". In the first case the frustration is "blamed on to" external persons or things. If it is uninhibited a direct attack by violence or criticism may be made; if it is inhibited the response may find expression by the roundabout means of projection, whereby some possibly innocent, agent is ac

(1) Himmelweit, Hilda, "Frustration and Aggression" in Psychological Factors of Peace and War. Ed. T. J. Pea. Hutchinson, 1940, p 177.

(2) Rosenzweig, S. "An Experimental Study of Repression". J. Exp. Psych. 1943 XXXII, 64.

(3) Rosezweig. S. "Types of Reaction to Frustration". Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1934, 29. p 293-300.

cused as the aggressor. The "intropunitive" response is directed inwards, and the subject blames himself for his failure to achieve his end, and therefore tends to express guilt or remorse. The third alternative is a conciliatory attitude; defeat is accepted and glossed over. Such responses are by no means "pathological" in nature; they are only pathological if misdirected. A man may justly blame the careless motorist who has run into him; he may justly blame himself for his foolishness, and he doubtless should accept some slings and arrows "philosophically". What, however, happens is that some people put the blame for all misfortune on to external agencies — it is never their fault. Other people always blame themselves for everything that happens to them, while still others carry indifference too far.

The problem is: are these differences, when they are built into the personality structure, due to constitutional pre-disposition, or are they due to training in infancy? Obviously we should expect that training will have left its mark. Rosenzweig suggests that the extra-punitive response is the most infantile one, that intro-punitive responses come later and the impunitive attitude last of all. This sounds plausible enough, but the question of great importance for the explanation of some forms of delinquency is: are there cases in which, because of some constitutional defect, the passage from the first stage to the second cannot be made with success? To that there is so far no answer.

It will be noted that other responses besides aggression in violent or verbal form may be made in a frustrating situation. The children in Barker's

experiment "regressed" to a less constructive level. Another possible response, found in the same experiment, is simply to give up, and accept defeat. Yet another, noticed by Allport, Bruner and Jandorf ⁽¹⁾ is apathy. They studied the accounts of ninety German refugees who had suffered under the Nazi régime. "Besides aggressive responses, direct or displaced," they say, "we find defeat and resignation, regression, conformity, adoption of temporary frames of security, changes in standard of evaluation, lowering of levels of aspiration, heightened in-group feeling, increased fantasy and insulation, and, above all, increased planning and problem solving."

Furthermore, according to Maier, ⁽²⁾ frustration may give rise to a response, which is non-purposive — a mere exasperated gesture, and which gets "fixated" and is repeated in the frustrating situation over and over again, irrespective of its uselessness.

The above list, which rings true to life, reminds us of the limitations which attend the experimental method in this field. The kind of frustration possible in a laboratory can only be a pale imitation of the frustration of real life. This does not mean that experimentation is useless; on the contrary, it makes us look for features in real life which we might otherwise miss, and suggests hypotheses which we can then proceed to test. It does mean, however, that we must expect the responses to frustration in real life to be more complicated than those elicited under experimental conditions. As Dr. Himmelweit observes, the laboratory experiments "touch the fringe only of the frustration

(1) "Personality under Social Catastrophe" in Personality. Ed. Kluckhohn, C. Chap. 25
(2) Frustration. McGraw-Hill, 1949.

experience considered important by Freud". (1)

We therefore have to supplement the evidence of everyday experience and that of experiments by adding that of clinical study. In psycho-analytic theory the theme of aggression has for some time displaced that of sex. In the first place many neurotic symptoms and dreams, together with the ideas associated with them, can be made intelligible if we interpret them as signs of hostility. In the second place the anxiety and guilt, which are so prominent in the experience of neurotic patients and others, become intelligible if we think of it in terms of aggression directed inwards. The following scheme emerges: the infant responds to the frustration of its parents with aggression; this must be repressed for security reasons; a control is established on the model of parents and charged with the hostility attributed to them; this control inhibits a) the kinds of aims which have been frustrated, and b) the aggression which this frustration has engendered.

Such a schematic account does scant justice to the dramatic insight and ingenuity of the psycho-analysts. The point of it is to serve as a reminder of the enormous amount of aggression, repressive and repressed, which lurks within us, if their hypothesis be accepted. They have certainly shown abundant evidence that besides the anger aroused by obstacles of which we are conscious there is a mass of undischarged aggression trying to discharge itself if it gets a chance. So much, indeed, that Freud thought that it could not all be accounted for in terms of a response to frustration and accordingly postulated

(1) op. cit., p. 168.

an innate destructive tendency, which represented in us the Death principle in the universe.

We need not follow him into these fanciful realms. If we accept the view, that the infantile response must be thought of in adult terms, and if we add that the infant cannot understand the conduct of its parents and therefore responds blindly, there may well be enough frustration to account for the aggressive tendencies revealed by analysis.

To sum up this somewhat bewildering mass of data we may say that aggression in some form or another, immediate or delayed, overt or disguised and directed against the frustrating agency or against a surrogate (including the self), is a common result of frustration. To this we must add: 1) a situation may be frustrating to one person and not to another; 2) this will depend partly on the way in which the situation is faced (cf. Rosenzweig) and partly on the "unconscious" aggression in the subject; 3) an overt expression of aggression relieves tension and may enable the subject to act more efficiently; 4) the circumstances under which this is the case and related to the subject's confidence that his aggressive act will have no untoward repercussions; 5) aggression, overt or "repressed" may be directed "outwards" or "inwards": if the latter is a persistent tendency and if there is considerable tension we may expect a psycho-neurotic constellation, while if the former we should expect a criminal one.

It is clear enough that the problem of aggression is one of importance when we are considering the induction of a child into his culture. In so far as

he responds aggressively to frustration his aggressive conduct is a function of the amount of frustration his culture provides, heightened or reduced by the version of it he meets with in the specific adults who act as mediators. He will be further influenced by the amount of aggression allowed by his culture and its mediators. He will be influenced by the degree to which he is encouraged to act out his aggression on external things or persons, and the degree to which he is encouraged to blame himself. Finally, if a culture is characterized by a fairly uniform system of infantile frustration (e.g. the Mundugamor feeding system) we may expect aggressive personalities to emerge as typical of that society, and if a culture imposes strict non-aggressiveness (e.g. among the Sauteaux) ⁽¹⁾ we may expect signs of disguised hostility in the form of fantasy or beliefs in sorcery.

We have seen that there are other responses to frustration: defeatism, regression, fixation of a useless gesture, or a persistent pursuit of the frustrated act, rather in the manner of Dr. Levy's puppies, who, when their sucking needs were left unsatisfied, "sucked each other, their own paws, objects, and later on, after eating, licked the plate interminably". ⁽²⁾

A question of greater importance is: can frustration be accepted or rendered acceptable?

We have seen that what is frustrating to one person is not frustrating to another, in terms of the way in which it is presented. This is common knowled

(1) Hallowell, A. Irving. "Aggression in Sauteaux Society" in Personality. Ed. Kluckhohn, C. Chapter 15.

(2) Levy, David M. "The Hostile Act". Readings in Social Psychology, p. 264.

edge and has obvious practical implications. But common experience, backed by experimental evidence, teaches us that as we grow older our "frustration to lerance" improves. It is significant that in experimental situations younger children and neurotics, who may be assumed to have a high aggressive tension, stand frustration less well than older children and non-neurotics. Indeed maturity positively is an increased capacity to stand frustration.

This, however, is not the heart of the matter. The infant starts ex-hypothesi immature. He is frustrated in the course of his social training. One hypothesis is that because of the inevitable hostility this engenders he must go through life with a load of hatred proportionate to the frustrations he has experienced. Hence the discontents of civilization. ⁽¹⁾ Now there is a danger here of theorizing too much. It is one thing to say that the overt hostility we observe is traceable to unexpected sources of frustration, and that a great deal of conduct, much of which looks exactly the reverse, is really hostility in disguise; it is quite another thing to say that because the situations responsible for these manifestations are common to everyone, there must be a considerable amount of hostility lurking in them even though it does not show itself. Granted, we must prepare for surprises. The mildest of men may suddenly go "hay-wire" and theorists will say: "Ah, we told you so." But we have no business to say that there is unconscious hostility present until we require that hypothesis to explain a piece of conduct.

(1) cf. Civilization and Its Discontents. S. Freud.

As we look about us, with our eyes opened by the psycho-analysts, we see more signs of hostility than we bargained for, but it sometimes crosses the mind that there is not nearly as much as might be expected, considering the renunciations we all have to make. A good point is made by Maslow,⁽¹⁾ who calls attention to "an important distinction between deprivation and threats to personality". Deprivation we may learn to stand, and may even welcome it if be deemed a means of grace; a threat to our sense of worth, of being loved, is what really matters to us. This is, indeed, in line with Kardiner's concept of a satisfaction-frustration balance.⁽²⁾ "Where the rewards of impulse suppression cannot be realized by the individual, the super-ego loses its tonicity", which means that the restraint is not accepted but resented. There will no doubt be immediate overt aggression in the early stages of socialization, but if the rewards of renunciation are great and if the method of training is not taken to be a threat to the worthiness of the personality, then it would seem that a system of controls can be established without an undue measure of internal tension.

We may agree, therefore, with Miller and Dollard, who have modified the original frustration-aggression hypothesis as stated in Frustration and Aggression, that "the position aggression will occupy in the initial hierarchy of responses to any situation is largely a product of learning".⁽³⁾

(1) "Deprivation, Threat and Frustration" Psychological Review, 1941, XLVIII p. 364 and Readings in Social Psychology, p 281.

(2) Individual and H s Society, p 130.

(3) Social Learning and Imitation. Kegan Paul, 1945. p 534, n. 3

So far we have considered aggression as a response to frustration. The question must now be raised: if the response to frustration is aggression, is the aggressiveness a measure of the degree to which the subject is frustrated? Or can aggressive conduct appear independently of frustration? Ruth Benedict in her article on Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning to which we have already referred, ⁽¹⁾ quotes Prince Maxmilian von Wied as reporting the instance of a Crow Indian father boasting about his young son's intractability even when it was the father himself who was flouted: "He will be a man," his father said. She mentions another case of a disobedient urchin striking its father. When the mother, who was a white woman, protested, the father said: "But why? He is little. He cannot possibly injure me." ⁽²⁾

In these cases one may assume that the aggressive conduct was precipitated by frustration, but so far from the tantrums being deprecated, they are praised. The conduct after all has two aspects: it relieves tension, and it is itself — a clenching of fists, a stamping of feet, a pummelling of Dad. As a relief of tension it is tied to the tension it relieves, but as a piece of conduct it may acquire reward-value if it is greeted with admiration. Thus it would appear, aggressive conduct may be trained as a quasi-independent type of behaviour which may even acquire such autonomy as to be pursued for its own sake. Similarly gestures of sympathy, kindness and affection may be reduced in frequency if they are not encouraged or if they are actively

(1) p. 168

(2) In Personality. Ed. Kluckhohn. C., p 419

discouraged, and may, as Kimball Young⁽¹⁾ has it, become "reduced by lack of practice". The relative frequency of such gestures marks one of the great differences between the middle — and working-class cultures in this country.

CHILDHOOD CONTINUED

We must now return to the problem of social induction. The infant has passed through a certain initial handling which varies from culture to culture. Whatever this may be, it established certain expectancies and techniques which will echo down its life. As a boy or a girl its roles become more differentiated. It is either tied emotionally to a few adults or else its emotional attachments are diffuse. It is encouraged and rewarded for doing and saying some sorts of things, and discouraged and disrewarded for doing others, and from such experiences a control system is established, which repeats within a threat of what lies in store outside, to such an extent that some untoward impulses may be blocked at source. If the tension is too great alternative round-about methods must be used. More or less responsibility is thrust upon him or her, varying from culture to culture and from class to class in the same culture.

(1)Handbook of Social Psychology, p 73.

Armed with a certain wariness, the boy and girl look round. In a slowly changing society they are aware of a consistent chorus of admiration and deprecation directed by adults towards other adults. The recipient of praise are their models and bit by bit what has been conveniently called an "ego-ideal" is elaborated. In a complex and swiftly changing society the situation is different. In such a society praise and blame are not so consistent. Even in the home father may have one view and mother may differ, while auntie is a pacifist and uncle a Free Thinker. Outside the home circle it is worse. Not only do adults differ, but the company of youth may be arrayed against them. This is particularly true of Americans, where so many of the younger generation who want to be good Americans are bound to be critical of their parents if they persist in following the culture of their country of origin. No wonder the cry goes up that we must, in such large-scale societies, "educate for choice". (1)

However, even in large-scale societies, models present themselves. The main difference is that, on account of the hostility which frequently develops between adult standards and the standards of the young, the choice of models may be complicated by a desire to choose certain models just because the adults — in particular the parents — disapprove of them. It is a proposal of this that Margaret Mead's (2) analysis of the different disciplinary meth

(1) cf. Mead, M. Coming of Age in Samoa, Penguin, 1943, p 137. Linton, Study of Man. p 285.

(2) Mead, M. Social Change and Cultural Surrogates in Personality. Ed. Kluckhohn, C. p 518.

ods is of importance. She points out that there may be a conflict between the conscience-backed standards of the elders and the ridicule-backed standards of the young. This, she suggests, may lead to a sense of guilt which might be assuaged by devotion to a father-substitute — religious or secular.

At any rate, there the models are, and the child, awed or otherwise by the spectacle, sees the kind of thing in store for it. Infantile treatment, emotional relation to parents, happiness or otherwise in the home do not automatically turn the child into a good American, a good Japanese or a good A rapesh; the living representatives are required as patterns. What childhood's experience does is to make the copying of them easy or difficult.

A D O L E S C E N C E

As time passes the important changes of puberty occur. In our society this has long been thought of as a period of stress, due to the physiological disturbances which accompany sexual maturation. This view was elaborated by G. Stanley Hall.⁽¹⁾ Since his day, however, it has become obvious that the troubles of adolescents are culturally determined; and that the problem is handled in many different ways.⁽²⁾ Among the Samoans for instance the tempo of development is slow and the adolescent passes into his or her status by easy stages. For the girl "adolescence becomes not the most difficult, most stressful period of life, but perhaps the pleasantest time the Samoan girl will ever know".⁽³⁾ Among them menstruation is taken lightly.⁽⁴⁾ The boy has his boy friend who helps him

in his courting and in his more clandestine adventures, sometimes varying monotony with alternative intimacies. They are circumcized together and at seventeen join the Aumaga, "the society of young men and the older men without titles" — the "strength of the village" as it is called. (5) He indulges in all sorts of affairs, but at the same time makes himself proficient at some skill or other, which will bring him prestige if he is good at it, and may provide an entry into superior circles.

For the young Manus boy the position is very different. Sex is abhorrent and in the old days his only chances were with outsiders on whom he wreaked his vengeance and his pleasure. However, the young men were left pretty free to enjoy themselves. Nowadays they have to go away to work when they are sixteen or seventeen. Even so they do not have much responsibility. It is when they get home, or, in the past, when they had to marry that a new role confronts them. They must change from insubordinate, irresponsible fellows, into humble, hard-working sycophants, toiling to pay their uncles for the price these have paid for a bride the young men do not want, and struggling to achieve some measure of independence. No wonder they hang about the villages — "meek, abashed, sulky, skulking about the back doors of their rich relations' houses". (6) And all this, according to Mead, is

(1) Adolescence. Appleton, 1905

(2) Mead, M. "Adolescence in Primitive and in Modern Society". Readings in Social Psychology, p 6.

(3) *ibid.* p 8.

(4) Coming of Age in Samoa, p 53. (5) *ibid.* p. 27

(6) Mead, M. Growing up in New Guinea. Penguin edit., 1942. p 121

brought about through the leverage of shame. Sulking though they may be, however, no "period of emotional stress" is apparent with the onset of sexual potency.

From the evidence of cross-cultural research it would appear that puberty as such need have no overwhelming effects. The effects which it will have depend rather upon the attitude towards sex which has been inculcated. When it is not regarded as shameful in any way — as with the Marquesans, described by Linton (1) — the boy and girl now find themselves capable of new enjoyments. They naturally experiment with the opposite sex and with one another. (2) When, however, sexual gratification is treated as a shameful thing, the onset of puberty may lead to violent forms of indulgence, as with the Manus, or to guilt, as with ourselves. The difference may be due to the terms in which the "tabu" is phrased. If guilt is the response to the new impulses, then the upheaval of puberty is likely to be the greater, though even so, sex is by no means the only factor operating in such disturbed states as are popularly associated with adolescence in our culture.

When the new capacity for enjoyment is not so hag-ridden by guilt that no experimentation is possible at all, experiments will be made. The absence of companions of the opposite sex, certain emotional experiences in childhood, and possibly in some cases a constitutional bias (thought this is by no means certain) may, any or all of them, lead to sexual intimacies between members

(1) Individual and his Society.

(2) *ibid.*, p. 218

of the same sex. This may be temporary, intermittent, or a manifestation of a persistent preference. The social view of such conduct varies from society to society, and from class to class.

In some simple societies it is thought extremely comical. In others no notice seems to be taken, In yet others it is institutionalized; either those showing a persistent preference for their own sex are given a special position, or such relationships are an established part of the culture, whether or not other modes of sexual behaviour are indulged in. Ruth Benedict, for instance, tells us that: "The life-cycle of the Keraki Indian includes in succession, passive homosexuality, active homosexuality and heterosexuality." (1) A man is not made unless these phases are gone through.

In our culture, however, for reasons which are very difficult to determine, such conduct arouses strong reactions of disapproval. This may possibly be traced to the assimilation of elements of the Jewish culture-pattern through religion, but that cannot be the whole story, because other peoples who have come into contact with the same elements do not appear to feel so strongly. It is doubtless connected with the general disapprobation of sex, which is likely to be more intense when intercourse does not carry with it those responsibilities of parenthood, which might restrict other forms of indulgence.

Disapproval is very strongly expressed by unmarried men who do not seek heterosexual satisfaction, and this may possibly be interpreted as a sign that they themselves are inhibiting the inclinations they condemn. If

this is the source of their disapproval, one would look to emotional relations in the family circle as responsible for the syndrome from which they are suffering: repressed homosexuality plus overt preoccupation with the subject and condemnation of it. Thus it may be that intimate family relationships, characteristic of our society, are responsible for this curious attitude.

Culture contact on a religious basis is not a satisfactory explanation, for unless there are emotional grounds of acceptance, an attitude which reason condemns has no chance of being assimilated. A great deal of further research is needed to discover the causes of our anomalous pattern. Meanwhile our attitude towards homosexuality affords an instructive example of the resistance of a culture-pattern to change; judges and even doctors are caught up in it and lend their prestige to its perpetuation.

To return to the adolescent; the physiological changes of puberty also include changes in size, musculature, and the secondary sexual characteristics. These may place the adolescent at a disadvantage in societies in which much attention is paid to physical appearance. In the case of girls there is an additional factor: menstruation. This is handled by some societies with great precaution. The girls may be segregated and their freedom limited by numbers of taboos, which serve to underline the specialized role of the female in such societies.

More important, however, than sexual development is the social status of

(1) Benedict, R. "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning". Psychiatry, I, 1938, p 161, cr. Kluckhohn, C. (ed) Personality, p 422.

the adolescent. This has two aspects: the young man is on the threshold of participation in that part of the total culture that is mainly responsible for its preservation, and he is being received as a newcomer by the adults already in possession. In many simple societies a ceremony of initiation marks the passage from one status to another. The convenience of this is that fairly definite roles are established — before and after. The ceremonies differ widely, some of them symbolizing rebirth, some of them involving tests of endurance, and some of them including such striking opportunities for cruelty on the part of the initiators that we cannot help wondering whether they are not outlets for the resentment of the adults towards their future dispossessors.

In our society, save in those interesting cases of "initiation ceremonial", when a young man goes to work for the first time, we have no clear-cut roles. This, as is often said, is the cause of most of the disturbance associated with adolescence. "In our society," says Kingsley Davis,⁽¹⁾ speaking of America, "even apart from the family, the adolescent finds an absence of definitely recognized, consistent patterns of authority. Because of the compartmentalization of the culture he is defined at times as an adult, at other times as a child."

The same point is made by L. J. Barnes in his *Youth Service in an English County*.⁽²⁾ A propos of the view that the obstreperousness of youth is a sign of insufficient discipline he says: "It would be nearer the mark to say that he is suffering from chronic overdoses of it already. The

(1) Quoted: Sherif, M. *Outline of Social Psychology*, p 320

(2) King George's Jubilee Trust, 1945, p 20

capacity for responsibility is like any other human capacity; it arrives at health and strength through exercise. If modern youth is irresponsible, a main reason is that the adult world accords it few chances of shouldering responsibility." While Linton ⁽¹⁾ writes: "In societies which recognize adolescents as a distinct category and ascribe to them activities suited to their conditions, the period passes with little or no stress." As for us, "We alternately demand from them the obedience and submission of childhood and the initiative and acceptance of personal responsibilities which go with adult status."

The social position is obviously difficult. In the country "Youth" does not seem to be a problem; they already know what to do. In the towns this is not the case. In the first place they are not as skilled as the adults and in the second place they are faced with opportunities of enjoyment which they find it difficult to handle with restraint. The nagging frustration of their dependency tends to exacerbate their desire to show their age. ⁽²⁾

The hostility towards the older generation can easily be exaggerated. In our own society it would be improper to say that "Youth" really does not present much of a problem, because there is a "Movement", and where there is a Movement there must be something for it to "move" about. To the casual observer, however, the crisis is not as apparent as it is to those of more refined sensibilities. Elsewhere, on the other hand, youth has become a cult. In America the desire which the parents have to see their children flourish in popularity and sweep on to success has led them to cultivate Youth, to place

(1) Culture Background of Personality, p 44

(2) cf. Fleming, C.M. Adolescence, Kegan Paul, 1948, p 22

their hopes in the Young, and to accept them as having rights which past generations would not have tolerated. Doubtless the anxiety to shed the vestiges of another culture and become adept at the "American way of life" is an important factor.

On the Continent at the turn of the century "German Youth of Karl Fischer's day loathed and hated the world of their elders". (1) Spontaneous groups, often attached to a leader, were the forerunners of an organization, fired with the ambition to undo the mistakes of the old men of Weimar.

It is interesting to note that in Germany particular emphasis has been laid on the "community of male youth", whereas in America "a much stronger emphasis has been placed on the cross-sex relationship". One of the results of this is that in America youth culture has had much less political significance than elsewhere. (2)

Where change comes about through culture contact, the young often adopt the new ways with avidity and parade their up-to-date fashions with defiance. Thus we are told of Egyptian town boys denouncing their fathers as "reprobates" and even "robbers" while the girls outrage their elders by adopting Hollywood styles. (3)

The German example illustrates in a somewhat extreme form another feature of adolescence, at any rate in cultures when the home circle is restricted.

(1) Becker, Howard. German Youth. Kegan Paul 1946, p 73.

(2) Parsons, Talcott. Essays in Sociological Theory. Free Press, 1949, p 230

(3) Hindus, M. Quoted by Sherif. of, cit., p 328

This is the tendency to seek companionship. It is a period of what Hollingworth has called: "psychological weaning" (1) An untying of the apron strings and a reaching out for other circles in which to satisfy the need for social acceptance.

The experience of home life, of acceptance, rejection, displacement or dependence, will determine the kind of group life which will be sought, and the role to be played — cringer, follower, boss, comic, or just "one of the boys". It may be, of course, that experience has contra-indicated companionship of large numbers, and the "isolate" keeps himself to himself. Such complexes of experience, in the home and in adolescence do much to determine the attitude of men and women in adult years. They may feel themselves to be unworthy of companionship, or they may withdraw into themselves, or they may take to blaming others for their own unacceptability. They may become hail-fellow-well-met, uncomfortable unless with the gang, or suspicious or shy or prickly or prepared to do anything to raise a laugh; the list is endless.

The period of adolescence is, as we have said, conventionally a period of stress. We have examined the causes of this. We should not, however, forget its joys, not so much the romantic joys of Youth — we are scarcely allowed to forget them — as the insidious joy of jolly companionship, often with people rather younger than oneself, which are sometimes so enthralling that adulthood is not achieved. The chronological age mounts up and the hair falls out, but the shorts and the open shirt are kept on, and the elderly adolescent

(1) Hollingworth, H. L. Psychology of Adolescence. Appleton, 1928

bikes off with knap-sack and gadgets, never so happy as when he is with the boys — primus inter pares.

Having passed through the key experiences of infancy, childhood and adolescence, of which some of the more important have been discussed, a personality has emerged with at least three features: (1) a set of techniques for satisfying basic needs. This set includes techniques for handling other people e.g. by obedience, by badgering, by bullying, by whining, by clamouring, etc., and also attitudes of dependency, demandingness, assumptions of service being forthcoming and so forth. (2) A set of controls which prescribes certain actions and proscribes others in terms of shame, fear, and/or sin. (3) A set of attitudes towards other people resulting from the treatment which the need for social acceptance has received. This may colour a whole culture, but it is also of importance in large-scale communities, within which smaller groups work or play together in face-to-face relationship.

These three "features" are, of course, not the only acquisitions by any manner of means. "Functionally autonomous" interest systems will have been established, intellectual ability will have developed as far as innate capacity and environmental opportunity have allowed, and a host of other characteristics will have been acquired. The three features selected above are of major interest to the social psychologist.

Now the significant varieties of social situations, which are responsible for the creation of different personalities, are of interest to the social psychologist from two points of view. In the first place they are important as social

factors which play a part in producing different personalities within the same culture. Here the interest of the social psychologist overlaps with the interest of the "individual" psychologist. In the second place, however, where differences in these key situations enable us to contrast groups of people, as, for example, the Arapesh and the Mundugomor, or the upper class and lower class in the same culture, they may throw a light on some of the general characteristics of the different groups. This is partly due to the fact that the effects are, as it were, cumulative.

Supposing it were true that the children of the "middle" class are brought up to be more responsible than is the case with children of the "lower" classes, (1) then that sense of responsibility is likely to be reinforced by mutual expectation among nearly all "middle" — class people who consort together. The same would be true *mutatis mutandis* of the "lower" class. If, again, a child of either class were brought up by the methods characteristic of the other class one might expect a sense of responsibility or the lack of it to develop, but he would present an entirely different social-psychological problem. We could not regard him as illustrating the prevailing culture, for he would not do so, we should be interested in his fate as an oddity and possibly as a misfit.

These two different points of view alternate when we consider the future that opens up to the young men and young women, whose moulding agencies we

(1) cf. Davis, A. and Havinghurst, R.J. Social Class and Colour Difference in child Rearing. Kluckhohn, C. (Ed) Personality, p 252.

have been discussing. Ever since they were able to take note of the people about them and understand what is said in praise or criticism, they have been forming stereotypes of the statuses with which they have come in contact, directly or at second-hand, through conversation, through reading, or on the films. They know what is expected of a man and a woman in their culture, and also what is expected of a husband, a wife, a father or a mother. They learn not only what such roles involve to the player, but also what responses are expected towards the player. Besides the "ascribed" roles, there are others: occupational roles, dignity roles, sporting roles, and so forth.

It is important to recognize that each individual only sees a very small part of the whole society, and that our model of a culture with its status/role system is a construct. The son of a miner, for instance, in a remote mining village sees intimately the playing of the miner's role, less intimately the playing of the shopkeeper's role, and very onesidedly the playing of the role of teacher, doctor, and clergyman. The son of the landed gentry may have a notion of the roles of doctor, lawyer, clergyman and landed gentleman which might prepare him for undertaking any of them, but he would be likely to have only a remote notion of the roles of engine-driver, dustman, or shopkeeper. Both boys may well construct stereotypes of all the occupations mentioned, but they will vary in content, accuracy, and clarity. In a very simple society, in which the number of statuses is small, and most "status-personalities" available for inspection, the young men and young women can make but few choices. As we have already seen, they may be slowly trained for adult life, or, as with

the Manus, it comes as a nasty shock. Their destiny, however, is more or less fixed, and the only problem is whether their up-bringing has been such as to make all the adult roles available congenial. The point of interest here is as to whether on the whole there is, in simpler societies at any rate, a general coherence between the prevailing methods of dealing with the key situations in infancy, childhood and adolescence, and the major adult roles which confront the boy or girl when they have grown up.

In our complex societies there is an enormous variety of statuses to choose from, though of course economic circumstances, lack of information, and availability of jobs, materially limit the choice. Furthermore every role requires certain qualities for its effective performance and involves conduct which many people would find unpalatable. In so far as choice is possible, some statuses are excluded because the stereotype, which may be a sketchy and mistaken affair, is not attractive. On the other hand choices may be made which prove unsatisfying. To meet this the twin sciences of vocational guidance and vocational selection have become established.

We have been thinking in terms of the individual choosing, in so far as he can, the status he wants to, in Linton's sense, "achieve". A problem of interest arises when we think of groups of persons. Supposing, as we did above, that one can speak sensibly of "class subcultures", with their prevailing methods of up-bringing and prevailing standards of culture, and supposing occupation-statuses which were once confined to one class now become open to another. Will the newcomers acclimatize themselves to the roles as previously "defined", or will the roles themselves gradually alter? There is very little

evidence upon which to base an opinion, but the subject is one to which research in the future will doubtless be directed.

The need to learn "achieved" roles is obvious enough, but nowadays in some societies there is growing up a notion that "ascribed" roles have to be explicitly taught. Of course we have already seen that in some sense all roles have to be learnt, but for biological roles this is done largely by the ordinary methods of praise, blame imitation and the like, rather than by lectures. However, there are so many different notions of the role of young man, young woman, husband and wife, that a good deal of confusion arises. Side by side with vocational guidance we are presented with the astonishing spectacle of marriage guidance and lectures upon the subject at our universities.

There would appear to be two views about this predicament; on the one hand we are urged to "educate for choice", on the other hand efforts are made to limit the choices made to such few as the propagandist approves of. Which you prefer, will depend, presumably, on whether you think that people's needs are so varied that they must learn to choose the best way of satisfying them, compatible with the least amount of human suffering, or whether you think that people cannot be trusted to do this and must be persuaded to conform to a pattern on the grounds that less human suffering will be caused that way.

ADULTHOOD

Of the cultural shaping -- or, rather, creating -- of

personality there is little more to be said. Certain general personality traits are largely determined by early experience. The roles of adult life — "ascribed" and "achieved" — will make their mark on top of them. The doctor the lawyer, the shop assistant and the clerk will be alike in certain respects — as, say, Englishmen or Frenchmen. They will be unlike in certain respects in regard to which the doctor and lawyer may resemble one another more than either resembles the shop assistant and the clerk. Each will be more like others of his occupational group in some respects than he is like a member of the other occupational groups. But here the multiplicity of statuses a man may occupy from time to time must not be forgotten. Thus, the lawyer may be different from the doctor when considered as exercising his professional role, but he may be like him as a father or as a member of the "professional class".

All the same, since the personality operates as a whole and not as a mere collection of roles, the fact that one person plays the role of doctor another that of lawyer, another that of shop assistant and the fourth that of clerk, is likely to make them behave slightly differently as father, as husband, and even as sportsman, though the influence of the "status personality" associated with an occupation on other roles will vary from person to person, from occupation to occupation, and from one situation to another. The civil servant may carry his meticulousness into all his dealings. The doctor may "drop" his professional manner readily. The lawyer may seal his lips almost automatically in all situations.

Combined with the concept of personality we have to take the "situational approach" into consideration. The question as to how far "achieved" status shapes personality depends upon a) how far the conduct appropriate to the achieved status becomes habitual and b) how far other situations elicit it. For instance the meticulousness appropriate to the civil servant may become so habitual that it becomes part of the personality structure and any situation may elicit it because orderliness is applicable to almost all situations. The respect of confidences which is part of the lawyer's role may become habitualized, but only a restricted number of situations may be relevant.

A lawyer might be prepared to reveal to his wife his opponent's score at golf, even if it were superior to his own, but he might not be prepared to reveal that old Pinkerton had claimed to go round in less than Bogey — or he might. It depends upon habitualization and the "definition" which the lawyer makes of golf. If as a golfer he is playing an entirely different role, then his role of lawyer may be irrelevant. If his lawyer-role makes him "define" his golfing-role as that of "a responsible-man-playing-golf", his training as a lawyer is relevant and gossip about the boastfulness of his potential clients may be out of order. In the case of roles which are highly technical but involve no general traits of conduct, one would expect the status to make but little difference to conduct in other situations.

OLD AGE

After adult life comes old age. Here the personality changes are a

function of the way in which the status of old man or old woman is "defined". This, in turn, will depend in part on the need the community has for their skill and wisdom. Among the Comanche, for example, "the good old man abandoned his medicines and dropped back into a condition of innocuous dependence upon the younger generation. The attitude of such old men toward their sons who supported them was one of almost pathetic gratitude." (1) Here we have the Oedipus situation in reverse. Those who could not bear this subservience kept to their medicine and tried to sustain their prestige by fear. In such a situation the skill in hunting and fighting is gone, and the old are not the repositories of any special lore, save that of magic, which is more of a liability to the community than an asset.

Elsewhere, however, respect is paid to the aged because their experience is considered valuable, and because the system of authoritarian upbringing has taken hold of the young. They are expected to be dignified and learned, and the role is one which obviously has its attraction, and will be carefully safeguarded.

In our society, as so often happens with biological statuses, the status of "old person" is ambiguous. On the one hand they are in theory wise and venerable, on the other hand they are out of date and in the way. This results, in many cases, in a tinge of resentment colouring their personalities, and an idiosyncratic response to a sense of being abandoned. Of course it is absurd to suggest that all old men and old women are alike. In our complex society there is enormous variety. There is, however, this common predicament:

(1) Linton, R. in Psychological Frontiers of Society. Kardiner et al., p. 79

their skills and wisdom are not as highly regarded as in times past, and they do not normally live with their children. These are social conditions, and each adult faces these conditions in terms of his or her adult personality as it has been shaped by past social relationships. The point of interest to the social psychologist is not so much the variety of responses as the changing social situations of the old, to which these responses are made.

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