

mario José testa
1962

AUTOR: FRANCIS L.K. HSU

TITULO: CHAPTER IX

CULTURAL FACTORS.

"ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT"

SOLO PARA DISTRIBUCION INTERNA

CURSO:

Desarrollo Económico

PROF: JORGE AHUMADA.-

CULTURAL FACTORS
FRANCIS L. K. HSU*

BASIC CONCEPTS

Two concepts will be most important to this chapter; culture and economic development. The term "culture" refers to human behavior which is learned. Culture consists first of all of social organization through which members of the society are grouped together into such entities as family, community, and state. Second, it consists of the particular ways in which members of the society react to one another. Here we have such things as chivalry or the penal code, the Bill of Rights or religious values. Third, every culture is based upon some language spoken or written or both. And finally, every culture contains some artifacts, usually known as its material aspect, such as houses or canoes, supersonic planes or the atomic bomb, which can survive long after the human beings sharing the culture have become extinct.

All of these together make up what we ordinarily understand as being a way of life. When we speak of "culture" we are referring to some or all of these component parts. They do not exist in a haphazard manner but are interrelated and tend to form a more or less consistent whole. Each culture pattern, then, tends to be consistent in two ways. It is consistent historically. That is to say no culture pattern comes "out of the blue"; it is invariably the result, or the descendant, of some cultural ancestry which has existed before and which has given it form and direction. A culture pattern is also consistent horizontally. The different contemporaneous component parts tend to dovetail or support one another. For this reason no culture pattern can completely break from its past, just as none can for long harbor two violently opposing tendencies without civil war or revolution. But no civil war can last forever. When the battle dust has settled, the emerging culture pattern may represent a

* Associate Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University. Author: "Suppression Versus Repression: A Limited Psychological Interpretation," *Psychiatry* (August, 1949); *Under the Ancestors' Shadow*; *Religion, Science, and Human Crisis*; *American and Chinese: Two Ways of Life*.

big or small break from the past, but it is never completely different from it. In most cases, of course, culture patterns evolve more slowly and their continuity with the past is easily recognized.

The term "economic development" may be defined as an increase in per capita real income. In this sense man achieved economic development when he changed from simply gathering food to agriculture, or from complete dependence upon rainfall to artificial irrigation, for such changes insure to man a more certain and abundant supply of food. In the present connection we must, however, broaden this definition a little for two reasons. First, the purpose of this volume is not to analyze man's development in the Stone Ages or in his Oriental or African aspects, but rather his transition from noncommercialized activities to commercialized ones. Second, and more important, while increases in per capita real income may be measured quantitatively, there are unmistakable reasons to believe that the transition from agriculture or nomadism to commercialization has important qualitative aspects. For example, this transition cannot be achieved unless a change of mental outlook occurs toward work and enjoyment of leisure.

Each human being has two facets to his standard of living: objective and subjective. The first consists of the actual conditions of existence to which he has attained. The second consists of those things which he would like to enjoy whether or not he is presently enjoying them. Different individuals within a given society or in different societies vary widely not only in their actual conditions of existence but also in what, if possible, they would like to enjoy. When a Chinese farmer has become well to do, he has tended to put the farm in the hands of tenants so that he can lead the life of an absentee landlord. But he does not usually wish to sell his land in favor of some other form of capital, nor is he prepared entirely to lead the new style of life which his wealth now permits. Instead, he will remain frugal and regard filial duties to parents as a part of the order of nature; he will continue his accustomed cere-

than metropolitan Los Angeles. For convenience, the cultural factors favorable to economic development may be grouped under three headings, according to the three basic elements of an economy, as (a) those favoring the availability of savings, (b) those favoring the utilization of resources, and (c) those favoring the availability of labor.

The availability of savings. Among factors favoring growth and accumulation of capital are patterns of income distribution, consumption, and saving. For capital to be available for industrial purposes there must be a certain concentration of income, whether this concentration is based on genuine surplus over the needs of the society or on deprivation of some sections of the population by actions of others. This concentration may come about through the inheritance rule of primogeniture, through outright exploitation, such as slavery and tribute to a ruler, or through profitable trade.

Habits of consumption are equally important in helping or hampering the growth of capital. The most relevant element here is consumption for reasons other than those of physical preservation or utility, known as "conspicuous consumption." For social or ceremonial purposes such as weddings, honoring of the gods, or debutante parties, peoples in many parts of the world are known to spend themselves poor. Where such conspicuous consumption is high, capital is not easily formed. On the other hand, in societies where thrift is considered a virtue or it is customary to save for old age, then the supply of funds available for capital formation tends to be greater,

The last important element is the pattern of saving. If people do not indulge much in conspicuous consumption, or if they still have anything left after much conspicuous consumption, what do they do with what is left? They may hoard it in caches, which practice is better than conspicuous consumption. The growth of capital is facilitated if there is some customary channel such as co-operatives or banks which can make years have passed since the Communists have taken over, whereas the actual historical test requires decades if not centuries.

funds available for investment. Short of cooperatives or banks, some regularized pattern of borrowing and lending at interest may be of some help. Even high usury rates, though they tend to break the debtors in the long run and "kill the goose," may be helpful to economic development if the usurers can be persuaded, in their own interests, to invest in productive channels.

The utilization of resources. This leads to a consideration of the cultural factors which induce the utilization, as distinct from the mere availability, of resources. From the point of view of economic development, the accumulation of wealth, however great, is a passive asset. Unless there are cultural forces which press this accumulated wealth into productive investments, such as factories, roads, and mines, it is of no consequence. In precisely the same sense, the mere presence of natural resources will not help economic development unless there are cultural factors favoring the aggressive exploitation of them.

The American Indians came to the New World at least twenty thousand years ago. They found two continents as laden with mineral wealth as did the Pilgrims much later. But the American Indians exploited little of those resources and mostly led an existence not too far different from their Asiatic ancestors. Many European peoples, on the other hand, went to far corners of the earth looking for what they wanted when they failed to find it at home. The availability of the resources did not encourage the former, while their absence did not discourage the latter. What differentiated the American Indian's approach to the resources from that of the European was the factor of culture.

Culture affects the utilization of resources in diverse ways. Where the land and natural resources are communally or state owned, their availability for industrialization may depend upon whether the consent of the chief or the governing body can be secured. If resources lie in territories which people regard as unexploitable because of ancestor

worship or because of other supernatural reasons such as geomancy,⁵ then their utilization may be impossible, or can be achieved only after long delays.

The most important element in this connection is, however, technology without which exploitation of the resources can never be effective. Technology may of course be imported as it was by continental European countries from England in the early days of the Industrial Revolution and by many non-Western countries and Russia during the past two hundred years. All of these countries have received from one or more industrialized nations either machinery or technical advice or both. This cultural borrowing has evidently facilitated the utilization of resources in the recipient countries, greatly in the case of Russia and Japan.

But can importation of technological equipment and knowledge be adequate for purposes of a lasting economic development without indigenous science and invention? The answer probably depends upon the kind of economic development which is needed or planned. If the economic development desired is a slight raising of the standard of living or a short-term alleviation of poverty or malnutrition, then importation of technology is probably sufficient. But if the economic development desired is of a more permanent nature, aiming at a substantial growth and expansion of the economy, then there must be native cultural forces making possible an indigenous development of science and invention. This was what happened in all the European industrial countries which initially borrowed from England. This has also in part been true of Japan.

The availability of labor. There are several cultural factors favoring the availability of labor. First, after producing the requirements for the maintenance and continuation of the society, under its traditional standard of life, is there a surplus in the working population? Alternatively the question may be put thus: If we were to open up avenues of employment other than those previously existing in the society, what por-

5. This may be described as the earthly counterpart of astrology. Instead of the idea that the movements and junctions of the heavenly bodies determine the individual's fate, geomancy is built on the premise that the location and geographic configuration of one's house, ancestral graveyards, and village have strong effects on his chances of success, failure, life, and death.

tion of the labor force could we get without endangering the basic mode of existence of the society? Second, even if there is a surplus, can members of the labor force go anywhere freely, as dictated by the needs of economic development? People may be unwilling to leave their home villages for social reasons, or they may have a taboo against crossing water or using certain types of transportation. Or they may simply not be in the habit of seeking work anywhere except in their immediate circle of familiarity. Third, will the available labor force be willing to work in factories where men or women have to obey a rigid routine of hours and conditions of work, and where the individual worker handles but one of the many different production processes? Will it be willing to go through the necessary trouble of learning the appropriate skills? Will it stay in the factory for a reasonable length of time and not create a problem of rapid turnover?

In addition, some previous exposure to formal education may facilitate matters although, as noted later, this is not essential. Then, if the prestige pattern among the people in question is founded on material gains, and the latter can be more or less freely acquired, it may make economic development easier than if their basis of prestige lies elsewhere and wealth is restricted by caste or inheritance. Finally, the question of vertical and horizontal social mobility is important. There may be a great deal of actual mobility, or there could be much less of it, but it is essential not only that there be the idea that some mobility is possible, but also that such a possibility should obviously not be precluded by some caste or rigid class structure. Where both the possibility and the idea of mobility are present, people tend to be more easily attracted by new avenues of advancement than otherwise, even though such conditions do not automatically lead to aggressive economic attitudes.

From the above it seems clear that all explanations of economic development, or the lack of it, on such bases as an "interest in material things" or the "relative preference for leisure" are bound to be super-

ficial. However broadly the term "leisure" is defined, it is hard to see any significance in such a statement, since it is like saying that people do not want to work because they prefer not to work. Human beings of any cultural heritage will not refuse to work if there is, in their eyes, reason for the trouble. Conversely, if they decline to work, it is because they can get their satisfactions elsewhere, not because of their "love of leisure." For instance, the assertion that reservation Indians simply have no desire to improve their economic condition is founded on the observer's ignorance of the real reasons for their lack of enthusiasm for economic betterment.⁶

THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT

However, economic development of a society is only one aspect of its general development. Therefore, not only are those cultural factors favorable or unfavorable to economic development interrelated, but the entire question of economic development must be considered in the total framework of human conduct, and cannot be treated separately from it. The logical starting point of inquiry into man's conduct in economic activities is, then, the basic nature of man's existence itself.

In addition to his own psychology and physiology, every human being has to deal with two environments. One consists of material heritage from the past, such as architecture and technology, and natural environment, such as vegetation, climate, and minerals. The other consists of human beings who stand in kinship—marital, economic, social or political relationships—to him.

While it may be impossible to state precisely the exact importance of either of these environments, there are good reasons why the human environment is much more important to man than the physical. The individual begins life by complete dependence upon other human beings. During infancy this dependence chiefly centers around food and bodily protection.

6. See Ralph Linton, "Culture and Personality Factors Affecting Economic Growth," in Bert F. Hoselitz, editor, *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 76-77.

What he does gradually learn is that one, such as the mother, or several persons, including aunts, grandmothers, or some in-laws, are his answer to all problems, because they administer to his needs and respond to his cries. To the infant the most crucial sources of his discomfort or satisfaction are such individuals who may administer to his needs and answer his cries. He is ignorant of the sources of his food, or even its variety, but will accept or reject, or like or hate, the food depending upon who feeds him and how he is fed.

As the infant grows, he learns to differentiate between the animate and the inanimate, between animals and human beings, and between some human beings and other human beings. In becoming conscious of a wider and wider universe the maturing individual has essentially to integrate his new experiences with what he has known before. That is to say, at each step of the individual's growth he interprets the new by projecting the old. He may have become independent of human beings, such as parents or siblings, but he is likely to substitute other human beings such as wife, children, or friends.

It is not enough that a person be just adequately fed and comfortably clothed. He must also have parents who love him and others with whom to live, play, and work. It is not enough, as he grows older, to have a wife or husband. The normal thing is for each person to desire a wife or husband of whom the person can be proud before neighbors, friends, and the world at large. To achieve a desirable place among fellow men, most human beings are willing not only to endure hardships originating from the physical environment but even to accept self-destruction. A girl may purposely starve herself in order to achieve a "good figure". A man may give up his job, his rice bowl, in the interest of an ideal which he holds dear. The extreme examples of such actions may be found in the Hindu widow who throws herself on her husband's funeral pyre or the soldier who, exceeding the call of duty, dies for his country.

The individual's concern about others need not be motivated by any

to be
a man
a man
a man
a man

Ver from
the animal
into man
etc

noble purpose. Unless we assume some unlikely instinct for selfdeprivation or destruction, and unless we can make hermits, great thinkers, or lunatics out of the majority, we must admit that the most basic concern of man is other men. This is why in all societies we have ideas of honor and decency. This is why we have taboos and religions. It is to control and regulate relationships between men that we have ethics and laws. As human beings have left their animal ancestry, their problem of existence has become a group matter, and their most basic concern is not the direct satisfaction of their individual impulses in the physical environment, but the satisfaction of these impulses through finding the most appropriate place among their fellow men.

THE INTERNAL IMPETUS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

While man in all societies is concerned with other men, differing patterns of culture cause him to regard others in different lights. In this respect, the contrast of China with the West is most illuminating. The Chinese culture pattern has as its central theme what may be described as mutual dependence among men. At the core of this pattern lies the tie between parents and their male children. Economically, all sons have the unquestionable duty of economic support of their father, just as the father's possessions automatically and equally belong to the sons. There is no question of inheritance in the Western sense of the term. For even if the elder were to make a will in the interest of someone else, it would have no validity against the long-established custom. Socially, the bond between the two generations is just as striking. The Chinese proverb has it thus: "In the first thirty years of a man's life, one looks at the father and respects the son, while in the second thirty years of a man's life, one looks at the son and respects the father." That is to say, while the son is young, his father's social status determines his place in society, but when the son has grown up and the

father has become old, the son's status determines that of the father.

This automatic father-son bond is the basic link between all generations. It is the foundation of all other relationships within the primary groups, such as the family, the clan, and the community. It even serves as a model for wider relationships, such as those between teachers and their pupils, employers and their employees, and rulers and their subjects. It is, however, within the primary groups that the individual Chinese has his inalienable place in life. He can be very competitive when necessary to better himself and his father. But in so doing he has to follow the footsteps of his forebears or deviate from them according to the established routes of advancements, which meant in the past scholarship and officialdom. Even in Republican China the traditional competitive routes forenterprising young Chinese broadened but little. Their center remained the professional community. Once having made the entry, the ambitious young man sought opportunities in bureaucracy. The lesser alternatives included teaching, preferably in colleges, but also, tolerably, in high schools. Very few of the graduates from modern Chinese schools went into business and industry and fewer still into work involving any manual capacity.

When an individual has improved himself, his parents, his clan, and his community will shine with him, for, through the pattern of mutual dependence, his honor is theirs. But he does not have to do these things if he does not care to. His worth as a human being does not depend on accomplishment of them. Nor is there much stigma attached to failure even though failure is undesirable. Through the pattern of mutual dependence, his misfortune or failure is their too. In fact, they are in a sense regarded as being responsible for his misfortune or failure.

This relationship is especially clear in certain features of Chinese religion. According to Chinese ideas, in ancestor worship, the condition of descendants is invariably related to the behavior, imagined or

real, of one's ancestors. A successful man owes his success to the merits of his ancestors, just as a man who has failed owes his failure to the demerits of similar forebears. For example, the son of a thief may become a prominent member of government. If this happens, the people will say that even if the father had been a thief, he must have been a good thief, who most likely stole from the rich and gave his loot to the poor, for how else would he deserve a descendant of this stature? In the same way as the father-son bond serves as the foundation for all other human relations, the merit-demerit connection between ancestors and their descendants is extended beyond the kinship sphere. For example a man's success will be explained because his family graveyard is well located or because his native village or district has the "Wind and Water" for prosperity. An individual is merely the agent of these forces which predetermine his chances in the world.

A Chinese who has failed or is in economic distress will be most happy if friends and relatives appear on the scene and lend him money or render him all necessary help. These benefactors can from then on count on his good will and his determination to repay them in the utmost of gratitude as long as he lives. If he does not, he will be avoided as a scoundrel. Furthermore, a Chinese who has been so helped will feel no embarrassment at all in letting the whole world know about it. He has nothing to hide when he is acting according to his culture pattern of mutual dependence.

The culture pattern of the West is the exact reverse. Details vary from one European country to another, but the central theme of this culture pattern is individualism. We do not know the exact time when this pattern first emerged in the West. There are good indications that, even as early as the Greeks in the fifth century B.C., the rudiments of individualism were already present, at least among the small nonslave portion of the population. Certainly by the sixteenth or seventeenth century A.D. individualism was already a firmly and widely

established fact in the West.

There has been some confusion among anthropologists and sociologists in their description of some non-Western peoples in this regard. One hears of the statement that the Manus of the South Seas are like Puritans or that the Chinese are among the most individualistic in the world. But individualism is to be differentiated from selfinterest or self-seeking activities. Self-interest and self-seeking activities are to be found in all human societies,⁷ but the characteristic Western individualism is founded on the assumption that the individual, any individual, has certain inalienable rights that are born to him or God-given. The basic expressions of this assumption are freedom and equality. Under these tenets, parents and children, employers and employees, rulers and subjects are at least theoretically equal, and any barriers, whether they be human, customary, or traditional, are in the final analysis to be removed if they are found to be stumbling blocks to the exercise of freedom on the part of the individual. Under the same tenets, each individual should be his own master rising or falling not according to his ancestry, not through the help that he may receive from others, but purely because of his own efforts.

Consequently, the Westerner's success is individual, and his triumph is great; but his failure is also own and his misery extreme. If he succeeds, the whole world is at his feet. Even his wife and children are among his worshippers, for the benefits he bestows on his wife and children are signs of his success. Conversely, if he fails, the world has collapsed for him. There is a distinct danger that his wife may leave him and his children will be disillusioned with him. His anchorage in the world beyond his immediate family is even flimsier.

The Westerner must have success because he has no retreat. A Westerner who has failed or is in economic distress may not decline help from friends and relatives at the moment, but, in the normal course of events, he will feel thoroughly uncomfortable because they have

7. Francis L.K. Hsu, "Incentives to Work in Primitive Communities," American Sociological Review, VIII, 6 (1943), pp. 638-42.

seen him at his worst. There is nothing more ruinous to an individualistic person's self-respect than to fail and so be dependent upon other human beings. Therefore, he will not only entertain little lasting gratitude toward his benefactors, but what he is likely to show them in return is resentment and often withdrawal from otherwise satisfactory friendships.⁸

Thus for the Chinese success is desirable. But if he lacks success, he still retains his inalienable place in the primary groups, wielding his authority as father and fulfilling his filial obligations as a son. Since personal success or failure is relatively unimportant to their basic security because their anchorage among fellow men is firm and unshakable, the Chinese tend to lack the determination and the desire to grind forth toward remoter goals. On the other hand, with Westerners, since success or failure is vital to their very security because each individual stands or falls alone, they are inclined to go every inch of the way in the spirit of the last battle and to persevere even though all odds seem to be against them. For what they lack in a strong anchorage among fellow men, they have to make up by controlling the physical universe.

Economic consequences. Once these differences are understood, we are in a better position to deal with their specific consequences in economic development. One of these is the limits placed on methods of excelling over fellow men in China in contrast to their much greater variety in the West. The individualist handles his own affairs and takes his own consequences. As soon as he reaches majority, he enjoys exclusive material possession, exclusive contractual powers, and the right to build his own career as he pleases. In his competitive efforts he is therefore relatively free from tradition, parental authority, or communal demands to stay within certain pre-existing limits. If his father is a wine merchant, he may take up law or become a clothier. Or if his father is devoted to politics, he can spend his time on schol-

8. A projection of this Western psychology is one basic reason why many Americans caution against foreign aid. According to this view such aid can buy only ill will later on. What these critics should realize, however, is that their worst fears are much more likely to come true in Europe, where individualism prevails, than in China, Japan, Korea, and other Asiatic countries characterized by the pattern of mutual dependence.

arship or religion. In short, there are many avenues open to him. It is not alleged that Westerners, in their search for selfimprovement, are entirely free from restraints by men and custom. But given a social climate in which the older people are on the defensive, each new generation tends to deviate more or less from the one before. Consequently, those Westerners who are aggressive can more easily try the unbeaten path and make something of it because of their culture pattern of individualism. Their counterparts in China can hardly do so with any hope of public sympathy. How closely the generations in China have been tied to one another is well expressed in the Eastern saying that what is good enough for the father is good enough for the son. Given a framework in which the elders and the ancient traditions are inviolate, there tend to be fewer individuals who are able and willing to deviate. Even when they do attempt to better their elders, they are inclined to follow the well-trodden ways, with the result that fast changes of any kind are hard to achieve.

For this reason neither the idea nor the actual possibility of mobility, whether vertical or horizontal (a question we briefly touched on previously), induced the Chinese as a whole to develop an aggressive economic spirit characteristic of their European brethren, which expressed itself in mercantilism and in the Industrial Revolution. Thus although the Chinese could move upward, he was content to move within the shadow of his ancestors. He did not rear to free himself from the rein of tradition. Similarly, while Chinese rulers had many times, historically—under the Han (202 B.C.-A.D. 200), T'ang (618-906), and Yuan (1260-1368) dynasties, ect.—conquered vast expanses of non-Chinese territory, Chinese colonizers who took advantage of the economic opportunities thus made possible by their conquering armies were few. Furthermore, to the previously noted fact, namely, that a majority of the Chinese, though hard pressed for bare necessities at home, made no attempt to go to the South Seas or the Western world after the sea

lanes became open, must be added another, that they were even slow in populating the outlying areas of China, such as Manchuria or Formosa.

Some common fallacies regarding economic development, In discussing the cause of lack of industrialization in China, Max Weber came closer to the truth than any other scholar when he pointed out that it was the nature of Chinese human relationship with its Confucian ethics which was responsible. But Weber was both guilty of ethnocentrism and wide of the mark when he characterized the forces which held back Chinese economic development as "irrational," in contrast to those "rational" forces which propelled the capitalistic history of the West.⁹ Our analysis makes it clear that neither variety of forces may scientifically be described as more or less rational or irrational than the other. Each individual acts to find his security according to the cultural premises of his society. The Chinese are oriented toward finding their best security among fellow men in the primary group because their culture pattern of mutual dependence makes such satisfactions honorable. The Westerners search for their best security in the control of things because their culture pattern of individualism makes all social relations temporary. If one is characterized as "rational" then the other one too must correspondingly be regarded as "rational."

The same error in thinking has been applied to attitudes toward experimentation. Consider, for example, the following quotation:

Where it has been learnt, human beings are experimental in their attitude to material techniques, to social institutions and so on. This experimental or scientific attitude is one of the pre-conditions of progress. The greatest progress will occur in those countries where education is widespread and where it encourages an experimental outlook.¹⁰

An objective study of the actual lives of diverse peoples in the world, including those of the West, reveals that human beings are remarkably "non-experimental in their attitude... to social institutions" in spite

9. Max-Weber, *The Religion of China* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951). First published as essays in 1915 in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Before his death in 1920 Weber revised these for book publication. Present English translation is by Hans H. Gerth.

10. See *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries* (New York: United Nations, 1951), p. 13.

of "education." How willing is any people to make a drastic change in its family organization? How ready is any people for a drastic alteration of its attitude toward sex? Even the obviously "experimental attitude" of Westerners with reference to "material techniques" does not necessarily come from any true scientific evaluation of the evidence. It is more attributable to a pattern of life in which science has become the "sacred cow," and scientists and technicians (including doctors) have taken over the important place occupied by medicine men and diviners in other societies.

In this connection we need only to review the many commercial products, from cigarettes to beds, that are advertised and consumed in terms of alleged qualities specified in statements like "Scientists say ...," or "Doctors all over the country have agreed...." A few scientists or thinkers may be completely experimental toward certain things, but the majority of the people buys this or that product or does this or that, not because they know or have thought through the intricate processes involved, but because it is their custom or habit to follow the advice of the "scientists," the "doctors," Hollywood stars, etc. There is nothing unusual about this. For all human beings, in their day-to-day existence, are guided very little by a scientific attitude and very much by faith. No one can eat in a restaurant without faith that the food is not poisoned; no one can drive on busy highways without faith that other drivers will obey the traffic rules. This picture is rendered more complicated by our emotions. Even the relatively small number of scientists and thinkers are never above emotional involvement. These few individuals may be "scientific" about a few things, such as the value of "pi", or the distance between the Milky Way and the remotest star, or even the characteristics of the American government, but on other matters they are just as subject to "unscientific" prejudices, preferences, loves, or sorrows as the next man.¹¹

Within their cultural premises, all peoples, regardless of education, are

11. The relationship question between scientific modes of thought and magical thinking in human behavior is treated in some detail in F.L.K. Hsu, Religion, Science and Human Crisis (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1952). There is a customary tendency to equate the word "experimental" with the word "scientific". This is not quite correct. Being scientific involves clearly defined hypotheses, definite procedures of testing them, and the discarding of the whole works if the hypotheses fail to stand up to the testing. On the other hand, being experimental may not require any

capable of being somewhat "experimental" toward certain desired objectives. Within a cultural framework of mutual dependence, the Chinese tend to be "experimental" in ceremonial and ritual matters by staging bigger and better weddings or funerals, or by building more impressive and costly graveyards and clan temples. On the other hand, given the cultural framework of individualism, Westerners tend to be "experimental" in their attempts to control the material universe by flying faster or extracting more copper ore. The Western reaction to the suggestion that one can be "poor and happy by being dependent" is likely to be as negative as the Chinese reaction to the suggestion that one can be "rich and satisfied without heirs and relatives." In either instance the culture pattern limits the sphere of satisfaction which in turn determines the objectives toward which a people will assume an "experimental" attitude. The objectives which will motivate the Chinese to be "experimental" all center around the strengthening of mutual dependence among men, but the objectives which cause Westerners to be "experimental" tend to fall in the sphere of conquest of the physical universe.

Imagination, science, and economic development. What really distinguishes the West from the East in this regard is the quality, extent, and intensity of Western imagination as contrasted to that of the East. Here we come upon another popular fallacy to the effect that the West is materialistic, while the East is spiritual.¹² But no people is too "otherworldly" to be interested in material things. Anyone who has any first-hand contact with nonindustrial peoples of the East or Africa will realize that, if it comes to bargaining for better material advantage, Chinese or any other allegedly "spiritual" folk are perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. For whether we define spirituality as otherworldliness or an emphasis upon the sight unseen, its most basic ingredient is imagination. Here is where the West has excelled the East in quality and variety, as well as intensity.

Compare Western painting with Chinese or Japanese painting. No one clarity or precision in the action taken or the ideas behind them. It may simply be a matter of a person in need of a pair of gloves shopping around for the most suitable pair, or one who desires a loan writing to all relatives until he gets it.

¹². This was most certainly what the previously mentioned United Nations authors had in mind when they declared that "lack of interest in materials" may also "be due to the prevalence of an otherworldly philosophy which discourages material wants." (Op.cit.,p.13.)

would deny that Oriental masterpieces are great art. But one unmistakable characteristic of the first is its emphasis on emotions, phantasy, and other subjects which are not easily or directly open to the senses, while typical of the latter is its unemotional matter-of-factness and its lack of concern for variation and originality. An Oriental painter could achieve great public acclaim and fame by being known as the best imitator of a well-known master of, say, the fourth century A.D. On the other hand, the play of imagination in Western art has gone to such extremes that many of the modern productions have not without reason been compared with individual dreams or even lunatic whims.

Western literature is equally in contrast to Oriental literature. Nearly all novels in the West dwell in part or whole on the introspective aspects of the characters portrayed. In fact, many such a novel is based on the mental picture of a single individual. These Western literary qualities are as far removed from those of the Orient as are the two poles of the earth. Oriental novels practically never deal with introspection, if with any mental life at all. What they mainly do is to depict man and events entirely in terms of external action.

Art and literature are strong reflections of reality. For the same East West contrasts are to be found in almost every aspect of life in the two worlds, from marriage to religion and from philosophy to politics. Although shortage of space here precludes any extensive documentation of this point, its origin is not far to seek. The Western flair for imagination comes from the loneliness in Western life to which American writers, from James T. Farrell and Thomas Wolfe to Sherwood Anderson and Carson McCullers, have mostly or even wholly devoted their literary talents. The lack of compulsion among Easterners, especially the Chinese, to penetrate the unknown is due to the absence of opportunities for such misery in their midst, a fact made equally clear by writers of their fiction. Loneliness is inevitable where human relationships are but transitory and where each individual is the master of his own success or failure.

Conversely, loneliness is practically impossible where the concept of privacy is absent and where even marriage and support are arranged and assured by parents.

However, this Western loneliness, though sometimes terrible in its consequences on the mind of the individual, is the fertile field which has nourished Western imagination, which in turn is the basis of Western science and invention, the most essential ingredients of economic growth of the Western type. What distinguishes the Oriental attitude is not spirituality, but the emphasis on human mutual dependence which, though eliminating loneliness, curtailed imagination, limited scientific interest and achievement, and gave the people no incentive to embark on the unbeaten path. We thus come to a position very different from that which is popularly held; namely that Western materialistic achievements, instead of being opposed to spirituality, were actually based on a degree of spirituality unknown in the East.¹³

The several factors outlined do not, of course, work singly. They buttress one another to make the differences much greater than they would separately have been. Thus the Chinese culture pattern not only promoted little imagination, but even those who had a flair for imagination found it hard to do what their imagination would lead them to do. Furthermore, even if they were free to follow their imagination, the security in their human relationships would prevent them from entering into such pursuits with an emotional drive, curiosity, and a feeling of urgency and determination—characteristic of industrial empire.

The differing ways of life of the Chinese and Westerners can also directly encourage the growth of capital or make it scarce. Here we hit upon a paradox. On the one hand, the Chinese seem to be among the most frugal peoples in the world. Parents admonish their children to eat every grain of rice in their bowls; neighbors frankly censure one another for signs of extravagance. This emphasis on frugality is even typical of the relatively well-to-do in most villages and small towns. Yet on the other hand, on all ceremonial occasions, the usually frugal Chinese

¹³. For a fuller exposition of these views, including the connection between spirituality and materialistic achievements, see F.L.K. Hsu, *Americans and Chinese: Two Ways of Life* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953), Chapter XIV.

tends to forget his frugality. In his monumental work on Chinese agricultural economy, J.L.Buck shows that many farmers went into debt in order to purchase food and to meet the cost of birthdays, weddings, and funerals. The average cost of a wedding was about four months' net family income, while the customary funeral cost, about three months' net family income.¹⁴

The reason why the Chinese engages in conspicuous consumption to this extent is that he owes it to others—parents and relatives, friends and fellow townsmen. He has, therefore, little leeway in determining the extent to which he disburses his surplus. And even if he possesses no surplus, he still is forced to engage in conspicuous consumption because the latter is essentially ceremonial in nature, not personal; hence the character and the degree of the individual's expenditures are commanded by his established place in the community. No one expects to raise his class-standing by conspicuous consumption, but to the Chinese dissipated wealth tends to be much less important than disrupted human relationships. Hence, for such purposes, the rich may spend themselves poor, while the relatively poor often do not hesitate to make themselves even poorer.

In indulging in conspicuous consumption the Chinese do not stand alone. People all over the world engage in it in one circumstance or another. But to the individualistic West conspicuous consumption is largely personal and only incidentally ceremonial. It brings prestige to the individual himself, and it is a token of class standing at the moment as well as an index of movement upward. Consequently, he is not only careful about expenditures which do not contribute to this personal sense of triumph, when necessary, also finds it a relatively simple matter to economize. The neighbors may gossip about the fact that he did not take his midwinter trip to the Riviera, that his wife is now assisted by one servant instead of two, or that the daughter's wedding was a rather small affair. But an explanation that business comes before pleasure,

¹⁴. Land Utilization in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), pp. 466 and 468.

that the son's departure for college made two servants unnecessary, or that the doctor advised a quiet wedding because of the wife's well-known nervous condition is usually sufficient to subdue the rumors. Conspicuous consumption in the West need not, therefore, be a drain on accumulated savings if the individual decides that the funds could be used to better advantage elsewhere.

The differing ways of life of the Chinese and Westerners affect the individual in the two societies from birth to death. The contrast is especially sharp at old age. At the threshold of old age the individualistic Westerner is threatened with loss of employment, leading to the loss of economic independence, or at least the likelihood of a lowered standard of living, but has nothing in sight except himself with which to meet these dark problems. His individualism makes dependence upon his children out of the question, and if he is forced to such dependence, it is a matter of extreme shame. On top of this he is further faced with social oblivion. His children, whether single or married, may have drifted away. Even if they are near, he has no important place in their scheme of things. At best he is an object of toleration; at worst he is plainly unwanted.

The result is that the individualistic Westerner must exert all his energy toward security for his old age. Even if there is no danger of poverty and starvation, he must meet the threat of social isolation. Only if he possesses great talents will he enjoy continued importance among his fellowmen. More usually he must compensate for old age by the accumulation of wealth, or by devices such as social security, pensions, and annuities. Short of permanent human relationships, he finds wealth one substitute which tends to assure him of a degree of attention.

The mutually dependent Chinese oldster has no such worries. He has no fear of unemployment. Long before he becomes physically incapacitated he has already retired to live thenceforth on the fruits of his youngsters' labor. It is not uncommon to hear a Chinese elder gloat to his

friends and relatives, or to anyone who cares to lend an ear, over the fact that he had a hard time when he was able-bodied but that now, since his children are grown and doing well, they have provided him with everything that he has ever wanted. As to his social importance, he gains it by leaps and bounds as the years advance, rather than suffering from its diminution. Since in the normal course of events the majority of human beings are likely to be endowed with male descendants, the Chinese has relatively little pressure to forge ahead continuously, either for the purpose of supporting himself and his wife or for the purpose of insuring a respected place among his fellowmen.

This Chinese and Western difference is faithfully reflected in the individual's relationship with the supernatural. The Chinese worships many gods, and he will frankly ask these gods for specific favors. There is a god of measles whose function is to see that the worshipper or his family will not get measles if he makes the necessary offerings and sacrifices. For similar reasons there is a goddess of fertility, an agricultural god, a god who controls locusts, a god of wealth, a god of literature, and a myriad of others, all of whom function under one supreme ruler of heaven. The Chinese attitude is summarized in such sayings as "We depend upon Heaven for food," or "Heaven and faith will determine the course of events." The individualistic Westerner's God acts quite differently. He loves, He creates, and He rewards and punishes, but characteristically the Western mottoes are "God helps those who help themselves," or "Pray to God and keep your powder dry."

Having his inalienable and psychologically comfortable place among men, and being equipped with supernatural forces on whom he can unashamedly depend, the average Chinese has no need to be perpetually acquisitive toward things, to risk his life by attempting to scale the highest peaks and to fathom the deepest ocean, or to venture into a physical world which may be hostile and unknown. It is in this context that we can understand the Confucian dictum that "When parents are

living one does not travel far away." It is in the same context that we can understand why many Chinese willingly engage in conspicuous consumption beyond their economic capacity. Finally, this context also explains such a popular Chinese attitude as "Wealth is treasure of the nation. Every family can keep it only for a period of time. It must be kept circulating." Such a relativistic attitude toward wealth is truly remarkable when we consider the poverty of the Chinese as a whole.

Having but a precarious place among men and being under the tutelage of a God who will not help him unless he exerts himself to the utmost, the average Westerner is compelled to be relentlessly acquisitive toward things, to conquer new worlds, to reach the North Pole, or to fly in the stratosphere. He must do these things in order to assure himself of a degree of security among his fellowmen, for apart from what he can do or can possess there is no other way in which he will be continuously loved or even appreciated. This is why Emerson wrote so glowingly on self-reliance. This is why, although since the Industrial Revolution the West has experienced a material prosperity unknown to the Chinese, the calculating rich, or even the kind of character made immortal by George Eliot's Silas Marner, is much more commonly met in the West than in the East. For to control wealth, whether it be the symbolic money, or wealth-producing tools, such as a factory or corporation, or natural resources, from land to minerals, is the Westerner's chief road to maintaining his importance among his fellowmen—his basic source of self-respect.

Cultural differences within the West. Although the Western culture pattern described thus far applies both to Europe and to America, there are certain observable differences between them.¹⁵ The principal difference between the English way of life and that of the Americans is to be found in the difference between individualism and self-reliance.

Basically both concepts are similar. The idea of inalienable right born

¹⁵. See, e.g., James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910); Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); D. W. Brogan, *U.S.A.: An Outline of the Country, Its People and Institutions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941); Harold Laski, *The American Democracy* (New York: Viking Press 1948); Geoffery Gorer, *The American People* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948); Henry Steele Commager, *The American Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale Uni-

with each individual is inherent in both; so are the ideas of freedom and equality. But while English individualism was most clearly expressed in terms of political equality and freedom, American self-reliance is intimately tied up with an insistence upon economic and social equality and freedom as well. A qualified individualism and a qualified equality and freedom have prevailed in England, but what has fired the zeal of Americans is a stark self-reliance with its extreme emphasis on complete equality and complete freedom brought about in part by the favorable ratio between population and resources. The English therefore tend to take classbased distinctions in wealth, status, manners, and speech as a matter of course, while Americans are inclined to resent them. This is not to say that all Americans enjoy the complete economic and social equality in which they believe, but the important thing is that in American life this complete equality is more firmly insisted upon and given more exuberant expression.

This insistence on complete freedom and equality is helped, in the first place, by the fact that economic opportunities are more abundant in the United States for the average individual than they are in any other country in the world. In addition, the many from-rags-to-riches stories, legendary or true, do stimulate American imagination and vindicate American faith in the reality of unlimited economic future. The emphasis on social equality is even more extensive in the American way of life. In its widest expression it appears as the pattern of informality. Ceremonies become brief; customs and traditions tend to be overrun by considerations of love or convenience. Even the parent-child relationship, that relationship in which every individual learns his cultural beginnings, has no clearly defined pattern. The instability of the marital bond is too well known to need elaboration.

Undoubtedly these are strong statements of attitude which, in fact, must vary somewhat from individual to individual. Exceptions to the described pattern can easily be found. But all social norms are subject

iversity Press, 1950).

Japan, with no apparent disadvantage in initial capital and equipment. By 1930 the Japanese firm had big steamers sailing all oceans and for some time holding the blue ribbon of the Pacific. The Chinese company, by that time, had dwindled into a concern with little more than a dozen river boats plying the Yangtze. Why did the two peoples, though sharing a similar culture pattern, behave so differently under Western contact?

One obvious difference between them is the existence in Japan of primogeniture, as in England and early America, whereas the Chinese rule has always been equal division of inheritance. This difference probably led to two results. First, primogeniture enabled the Japanese to accumulate capital, so that when Western pressure began, they had more of an economic foundation than the Chinese with which to start industrializing. Second, since primogeniture severed all but the oldest male heir from the family inheritance, it could foster a sort of need on the part of other males to leave home and search for their fortunes elsewhere. This was most certainly the basic reason why Kyoto was the largest city of the entire world c. 1700; the same fact also unquestionably contributed to the labor stability in modern Japanese factories.

Primogeniture, alone, does not explain the Sino-Japanese differences. The effect of Japanese primogeniture on labor supply was by no means as great as it would at first appear. For while the rule gave the oldest male heir the exclusive right to inheritance, the other sons did not have to leave the estate unless they chose to. In the absence of the Western pattern of self-reliance, this choice was possible because those who had in some way to rely upon their oldest brother felt no necessary sense of embarrassment. Even when Japanese left their homes, they looked, not for complete independence, as would their Western brethren, but for wider human ties, after the pattern familiar to them within the families in which they were reared. In fact Westerners, with their self-reliance, would have left home even in the absence of primogeniture. What the Japanese, with their mutual dependence, wish to do

"The Interrelations between Cultural Factors and the Acquisition of New Technical Skills," in Bert F. Hoselits, editor, *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 139-140.

away from home is to fortify their ancient traditions even more, and on a wider scale, in order to restore to themselves that satisfaction of which primogeniture deprived them.

The complementary factor in the situation, I think, is to be found in the different ways the Chinese and the Japanese are related to their respective governments. To the Chinese, his primary groups represented by the family, clan, and community are his all. His wider activities toward material gain or political glory are motivated and limited by his relationship with these primary groups. Occasionally a Chinese general or civil official did die to defend the government, thus putting the interests of the wider political allegiance above his allegiance to the primary groups. But as a whole this was rare, and what we see in China for at least the last two thousand years was that the individual sought examination honors or political offices, or engaged in other activities away from the primary groups, chiefly for the purpose of bringing honor, prosperity, and aggrandizement to the family, lineage, clan, and community. Within these primary groups, the community is least important and the clan is a little more so, while the direct lineage or the joint family is most basic to the individual. These primary groups are welded together to varying degrees by ancestor worship. Universally, all Chinese worship their lineal ancestors at least three generations back, if not five. In most parts of the country the Chinese also worship at their clan temples, in which the most honored place is occupied by an ancestor from whom all members of the same clan claim descent. Then, in many scattered areas of China, there exists many communities or villages known as the "Wang family village," or "Chang family village," etc., and inhabited chiefly by descendants of one common ancestor. But outside of these units the Chinese have little feeling of kinship or esprit de corps with each other. The Nationalist administration tried for many years to modify this pattern without significant success. The Communists are trying to accomplish what the Nationalists failed to do, and more,

same factors of loyalty characteristic of the primary groups, have never been troubled by the kind of corruption traditionally synonymous with Chinese bureaucracy.²⁰ For what made the Chinese connive or engage in corruption in government was their negative attitude toward their ruler and his regime, but what prevented them from taking a like view toward their private businesses was their positive relationship with such businesses, which they considered their own, or which were owned and run by people whom they considered their own, or in which misbehavior would cost them the loss of their respected places in their all important primary groups.

The customs of primogeniture and a primary-group-type relationship between the state and the people were among the most basic reasons why the Japanese met the industrial challenge of the West extremely well, while the Chinese proceeded but little in that direction. However, for these very reasons, the Japanese industrial structure was built on a foundation very different from that of the West: in the West, it was built on individualism and free enterprise; in Japan, on the same feudal system which bound the society for centuries.²¹

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GENUINE AND SPURIOUS

The foregoing pages show that industrialization can come about as a result of forces within a society, which motivate it to push toward a higher standard of living, or of pressures outside the society, which more or less compel it to acquire a greater acquisitiveness. In the former situation, individual initiative is essential. In the latter situation, at least in Japan, individual initiative, founded on primogeniture and loyalty to the emperor patterned after primary-group relationships, is basic.

But some readers must have looked in vain throughout the foregoing for detailed discussions similar to those now under way on ways and

²⁰. For a detailed discussion of the contrasts between Chinese government and Chinese business, and the reasons for them, see Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 226-228.

²¹. Elsewhere I have taken up some of the points raised by F. S. C. Northrop in his The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), see Hsu, Americans and Chinese, Chapters VIII and XIV. Here it will be sufficient to point out that Northrop was right in stating (p. 419) that the "Japanese were the only Oriental people to become a nation of the

means for fitting certain new techniques, from the power plow to modernized dairying, into the existing cultural framework of the industrially backward peoples. This was no oversight. Piecemeal introduction of a given new technique may be successful here and there, in one connection or another, but without the fundamental forces which propel changes (of which the economic change is one variety) as a whole, such innovations are not likely to take root. They may even fail to last for long, much less to grow from there.

The point becomes clearer when we realize that most of the previously existing habits, customs, values, and even technical tools or skills of all nonindustrialized societies must be considered hindrances to industrialization. From this point of view, preindustrial Europe was as handicapped as the rest of the world. In fact most of the European hindrances were even identical with those prevailing elsewhere. Europe had much conspicuous consumption in the Chinese style; it had known much hoarding in caches because banks were unknown; its poverty was extensive, and the poor suffered much in the hands of usurers; and it was a feudal society in which the peasantry was tied to the land and to its seigneurs. Contrary to popular misconceptions the European labor force at first reacted to machinery and factory in very much the same negative way that European entrepreneurs have subsequently encountered in Africa and Asia. The literacy rate was very low, for public schools were unknown. As to beliefs in the supernatural, they were deeply involved with witchcraft, with folk beliefs, such as that the sowing of seeds should be done at new moon, and with the doctrine of predestination, as in Calvinism, which is not basically different from that which the Chinese believed up to the time of their contact with the West. Furthermore, Europe even had for a long time a guild system similar to that of the Chinese. And most Europeans at the time of the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution lived, like the Chinese much later, in villages or small towns in which primary face-to-face relations were essential.

Western type quickly." In fact he could have rightly extended his statement and said the Japanese were the only non-Western people succeeding so well. He was even right in attributing (p. 420) this phenomenal success partly to the existence in Japan of a "feudal, hierarchic medieval society with its Emperor and privileged select orders." But he was in error in giving a major credit to Japanese Shintoism, that conglomeration of old Japanese beliefs, which he erroneously compared with monotheistic religions of the West; but he gave no credit to Japanese ancestor worship,

The fact is, however, that the Industrial Revolution began and flourished in Europe in spite of these and many other hindrances to economic development, but it has so far failed to take firm root in any non-Western country except Japan, in spite of Western pressure, example, encouragement, and leadership. How plainly industrialization failed to take root in Southeast Asia is emphatically stated by Hubertus J. Van Mook.

The age-long influence of the West . . . failed, with only few exceptions, to instill its economic activity and enterprise into the minds and habits of these peoples. The Western apparatus of finance, commerce, and production remained an alien, undigested and indigestible element in Southeast Asia. It had created institutions, means of production and communication and a stability far beyond the achievements of the past, but it had hardly awakened a new economic initiative or industry. . . . The social solidarity, the public spirit, and the economic energy that were necessary for a vigorous resurgence were lacking.

Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., who quotes the above, rightly points out that "This is true of much of South Asia, Latin America, and the Near East as well (with some notable exceptions) . . .," but he fails to go any further with it, being content with the vague statement that "all these Attitudes (which have prevented a new economic initiative) may turn out to be logical deductions from historical experience and existing institutions, or they may be habits carried over from previous eras, or they may be rooted in projective systems involving personal anxiety feelings!"²³

The fact is that since economic development of the industrial kind was not prevented in Europe by the many hindrances which also are present in the non-Western world today, we shall fall far short of our objective if we continue to dwell on these apparent "hindrances" and ignore fundamentals. Our analysis of the fundamentals leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the primary force of industrial development is the human need for conquest of nature in order to compensate for insecurity

which is the link between the Japanese emperor and his people, a link that the Chinese ruler and his subjects lacked. Northrop seems to have failed to see that neither Japan's modern political state nor her modern economic development was rooted in the same basic psycho-cultural forces which propelled Western nationalism and industrial revolution.

22. English manufactures, visiting continental countries toward the end of the eighteenth century, thought German and Italian laborers unfit for industrialization.

23. "Personality and Culture Problems of Point IV," in Bert F. Hoselitz,

among men. In the absence of an internal impetus in its complete Western form, the next best cultural foundation for industrialization would seem to be that of the Japanese. Here the pattern of mutual dependence and a certain insecurity due to primogeniture joined forces to extend unity of kinship to the relationship between the state and its subjects. The result is a culture pattern that, though failing in the first place to develop internal impetus on its own, responded adequately (certainly as far as economic development was concerned) to external pressures from the West.

The industrialization of the West and of Japan gives us what may be termed genuine economic development, which will, once set in motion, propel itself regardless of the external circumstances. Therefore, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that insecurity born of Western individualism is the best nourishment for that acquisitive spirit toward the physical universe which makes genuine economic development possible.

A secondary insecurity, like that arising in Japan out of primogeniture, together with a pattern of mutual dependence between the state and its subjects, helps to sustain the economic development once the impetus is applied from outside. Short of these types of cultural situations, the best which can be achieved under tutorship and aid from without would seem to be a sort of spurious economic growth. This is a kind of development which owes not only its inception, but also its implementation, wholly or primarily to a foreign power or regent.

Spurious economic development through implementation by a foreign power is exemplified by that which prevailed in colonial India, partially noted in Chapter XII. Spurious economic development through the rigid control of a single individual is best shown by the present condition of Bahrein, a tiny oil-rich archipelago in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Saudi Arabia. An American reporter states that twenty-five years ago the sheikdom was infested with disease and was poverty-ridden and terribly ill-governed. Today, after a quarter of a century of able editor, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

direction by an Englishman, but with no outside economic help, the country is healthy, prosperous, and peaceful—a paradise in the Middle East.²⁴ This phenomenal success was not simply due to the fact Bahrein is favorably located as a transshipping point amidst the oil and pearl riches on both sides of the Persian Gulf, or because Bahrein has oil resources attractive to foreign companies. The English regent wields unquestioned dictatorial powers, and he provides what he considers good for the Bahreinians, such as schools, hospitals, and modern conveniences. He prevents what he considers not good for them, such as anti-Semitism, and he censors their only press. There is no indication of any rising Bahreilian economic, or even political, initiative.²⁵

The role of the strong man. This does not mean, however, that all non-Western peoples, in order to achieve self-sustaining economic development, must necessarily also develop either a Western type of individualistic competitive system with economic reward as the basic incentive, the Japanese type of feudal structure centered in loyalty to the emperor, or continued foreign colonial control or tutelage. Industrial psychologists have found that economic reward, even in the West, must at least be partially supplemented by other incentives. For instance, American industries are advised to promote the factory as a "family" and reward workers in part with stock instead of cash. In any event, both the Western and the Japanese types of social organization are the end results of centuries of tradition which cannot be achieved in relatively short order, while colonialism or foreign regency is everywhere in disfavor. In their places, and as a matter of expediency, some type of dictatorship by a native strong man or an oligarchy appears to be unavoidable as an instrument to economic development. What peoples living under dictators or despots lack in individual initiative, the state compensates for by resolute leadership. What they lack in private capital formation, the state provides through revenue or foreign loans. What

24. See James Bell, "He Said Forward! to the Backward," Life, XXXIII (November 17, 1952), pp. 156-174. The British Information Service at New-York City, after looking over this article, informed me that, "In general, the facts related appear to be correct," although it was "unable... to establish its accuracy in detail."

25. It is not without interest that, in the Life magazine report, only the pictures of two "prominent" Bahreinians appeared beside one of the sheik: a director of boys' schools and an accountant in charge of the government bookkeeping system. There may be some Bahreinians who figure aggressively in their country's economic and political life, but this is

they lack in incentive to work, the state helps to supply by indoctrination of new values or reorientation of old ones. What they lack in efficiency, the state makes up by strict control and planning.

The principal drawback is that the dictator or the despot or his advisors may not be interested in economic development and may retard it. Take, for example, the differences in economic development between two princely states in India: the prosperity of Mysore in the south and the poverty of Patiala in the northwest seem to be largely attributable to the differences in their respective rulers. Should a dictator and his cohorts decide to act rashly, they may lead their followers to quick disaster. For example, the fates of Germany and Italy might very well have been quite different if Hitler had been less impetuous and Mussolini more far-sighted. Lacking the necessary socio-cultural foundation for genuine economic development, peoples who have made economic gains under foreign colonialism or native dictatorship will have little assurance that the trend is permanent.

This conclusion seems to cast a dark shadow over the future of the Point Four type of program. It appears to show that, at best, such a program will lead to economic developments of the spurious, and therefore transitory, kind while its usual results are much less impressive. Such pessimism is ultimately unwarranted. Spurious and genuine economic developments are not antagonistic. A Point Four program, well organized and adequately directed, may well lead many industrially backward peoples from spurious to genuine economic advances. As we observed previously, human beings are remarkably plastic. If the Western acquisitive spirit was a result of cultural conditioning and not of biological heredity, then all peoples can, at least theoretically, be conditioned likewise.²⁶ The failure of the peoples of the South Seas and elsewhere to develop an aggressive spirit of enterprise in spite of intensive Western pressure may be partly due to the fact that under the yoke of colonialism the natives were deprived of the necessary incentives and con-

not clear from the magazine article referred to. From what I know, this kind of spurious economic development also characterizes most of Bahrein's bigger neighbors-- notably Saudi Arabia.

26. The fallacy of overzealousness toward non-Western culture patterns and consequently of regarding them as being rigid and totally resistant to Western technology has been pointed out by Walter R. Goldschmidt in "The Interrelations between Cultural Factors and the Acquisition of New Technical Skills" in Bert F. Hoselitz, editor, op. cit., p. 150.

ditions for such a development, Now that colonialism is on its way out, at least in Asia, we may possibly expect the picture in the next century to be different.

Strong man: East and West. There are, however, two important things to be noted. First, of course, not all dictators act alike. Western dictators, reflecting the individualistic tendencies of their peoples, are more inclined toward aggressive economic policies. Their Moslem or Eastern counterparts, in line with the relative lack of such tendencies among their subjects, are more likely to settle for the status quo, unless they are under Western pressure and are convinced that their very existence or that of their subjects is endangered.

The second thing is even more crucial. The strong man in an individualistic country will not only tend to make aggressive designs, but he will have a stronger hold on his people than his counterparts in countries where the pattern is one of mutual dependence, or at least non-individualistic. As has already been indicated, the more individualistic the way of life, the greater the individual's insecurity. When human beings are threatened with insecurity, they will try to fortify themselves with more human bonds or hope to buttress their human bonds with material acquisition. Conversely, where human beings find their places in their primary groups satisfying and inalienable, because of their pattern of mutual dependence, they will have little need for wider entanglements and little or no compulsion to improve their ancestral standards of living.

We have seen how the effect of this difference in human relations was at the roots of the separate Chinese and Western economic developments. What we must now demonstrate is that the secure human relationships of the Chinese and the insecure human relationships of the Westerners mean that the hero, or the "great man," possesses wholly different powers among the two peoples. In the West, insecure human relations will spur the majority to look for more permanent anchorages in the wider human

society. A hero, or a "great man," at least partially fulfills this basic emotional need. Accordingly, Western heroes are ardently supported by many (just as they may be vigorously hated by many others), are showered with flowers, confetti, and kisses, have volunteers working for them, and must make many personal appearances before the public to renew their rapport with them. Their pictures are everywhere. Their relationship with their followers is a positive and personalized one: the followers look to them for leadership in practically everything. If the heroes smoke a Camel, their more devoted followers are likely to favor no other brand. If the heroes pronounce the Jews objectionable, their followers are likely to add force to anti-Semitism. If the heroes champion Christianity, their followers will take up the Cross. It is not suggested that such a hero will be able to make his followers do all the things he wants them to do, even totally contrary to their wishes. But there is little doubt that he will be able to wield great power among his followers.

The Chinese, because of their secure primary groups, have little emotional need to become involved in the wider society. Consequently, between the Chinese heroes or great men and the common people there is always a deep status barrier symbolized by residences fenced in by high walls, numerous bodyguards, enclosed sedan chairs, and absence of any personal contacts with the people, whether in private audiences or meetings. The higher the rank and the prestige, the more such barriers and distinction. Before the Revolution of 1911, the emperor and high officials were never to be seen by the people. Possession by any of his subjects of a personal likeness of the emperor was tantamount to treason. His name was never to be pronounced or written by the common people. Sometimes, somewhere, some great local official was such an object of gratitude by the local people that, upon his departure, the people turned out en masse to see him off. The stories, some legendary and some true, would have it that sometimes the people, old and young, even wept to express their loss of him. But, significantly, the followers, if such

they were, were never intimate with their hero or great man. They showed such signs of welcome or farewell because he, as a great man way above them, had been able to do things beneficial to them, the common people. After he left they might even build a special temple to house his effigy, to be worshipped year after year with incense, candles, and food offerings; however, the relationship was never a positive emotional tie, but merely a passive liaison in which status difference took the place of personal intimacy. The hero or the great man exercised his superior abilities and powers in behalf of the common people and they, as his subordinates and dependents with much less to offer, were duly grateful. They would not aspire to what he had done or was going to do.²⁷

All these facts serve to emphasize that while a strong man in a non-Western country and a strong man in the West may share certain superficial similarities and fulfill some identical roles, their respective influences over their followers tend to be drastically different. If this analysis is at all correct, a Western dictator will be able to mobilize his followers for good or for evil, for economic or political pursuits, much more easily than his counterparts elsewhere. This fact has obvious, important implications for China's future development, economic and otherwise, under the Communist regime.

The one over-all conclusion which may be drawn from this analysis is that, though the breach between spurious and genuine economic development may be shortened by outside aid, it seems safe to assume that this shortening process can be more easily and more rapidly accomplished in most underdeveloped Western countries, from Greece to Mexico, than in most underdeveloped Eastern countries, which share a common way of life with China, from Korea, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, and Malaya to possibly, Indonesia. India and the Middle East, by physical traits and cultural characteristics, are erroneously defined as such. Nor are they entirely Western. Japan, on the other hand, is thoroughly Oriental. But because Japan was the only non-Western nation which became as aggressive

²⁷. This Chinese pattern of hero worship has not changed materially in modern times. There have, however, been some superficial signs of Western ways of hero worship. For example, prior to World War II, portraits of Chiang and Sun hung everywhere, Their names graced many boulevards and parks. Chiang made many personal appearances. But these external changes did not alter the essential relationship between the Chinese and their leaders because of lack of a strong psychological identification. The result was that, when it was clear that the Nationalist forces

sive as the West, some Western characteristics which she does not possess were attributed to her. Besides the kind of error which Northrop made, the Japanese government before World War II was usually termed a dictatorship. This view received a special boost because Japan was allied first with Russia and then with Germany and Italy. But the Japanese government was never a dictatorship in the Western sense of the word, either militarily or politically speaking. The basis of Japan's success vis-a-vis the West in modern times was due, as we have seen before, to her culture pattern of a solidarity of kinship extended to embrace loyalty to the dynastic state. Japan shows little of the Western type of hero worship. The Japanese reverence to their emperor is much closer to that of the Chinese, previously described. No single Japanese, from Prince Ito to some of the most powerful generals, ever came even close to the kind of public acclaim, personal distinction, or dictatorial powers which Mussolini and Hitler had in their respective countries. The most that can be said is that Japan, before World War II, was under a sort of "dictatorship" by the military as a whole, in which, however, the lower echelons had as much "pull" as their superiors, which latter were often presented by the former with faits accomplis and had no alternative but to support the action of their subordinates. Furthermore, the whole military "dictatorship" was at least theoretically subject to the wishes of the emperor, even though the latter, by tradition, did not often exercise his prerogatives. The result of this pattern of mutually dependent relationships was that no one felt completely free to act. Even if an individual acted on his own, he might have to commit hari-kiri as a means of escaping the dilemma between individual wishes and the mandate of the society. No one was exempt from this dilemma. Japan's colossal economic development before World War II was, therefore, not the result of action by one or two strong men, but was rooted in the many features of the Japanese culture pattern outlined previously. For this very reason, we have even less rational basis for hoping to arrest Japanese ag-

were losing out to the Communists, most of his onetime supporters went over to the other side with great haste. See Hsu, Americans and Chinese, Chapter VI.

gression by eliminating a few so-called war criminals than we would for altering the future course of German aspiration.

CHANGING THE CULTURE

The thesis that has run through the foregoing pages is that economic development has, historically, been inseparable from a high degree of individual insecurity. We must now examine how this condition may be brought about in underdeveloped areas where it is absent.²⁸

Anyone concerned with the question of implementing any kind of aid program to underdeveloped societies which will promote a rapid and self-perpetuating economic growth must face the facts. In the capitalist societies, individual insecurity is based on individualism and primogeniture, which weaken the primary human relationships. In the hope of compensating for this insecurity, the individual fortifies himself with economic goods, or the symbols of their possession. Under the circumstances, economic development is not only self-perpetuating, but tends to gain momentum because the individual has to "keep moving in order to stand still."

As a way of promoting conditions necessary for economic growth in non-Western societies, this is impractical. It took Europe ten centuries or more to produce an individualistic orientation of life which bore economic fruit two hundred years ago, and there does not seem to be any way in which a similar orientation could be generated in a matter of years, or even decades. Yet in the modern world, any nation which hopes to take several centuries to evolve its orientation undisturbed is simply unrealistic. Moreover, any society which has not had primogeniture will find attempts at quickly instituting it resulting either in apathy or revolt.

The Communists have demonstrated an alternative method of inducing insecurity, which has underlined their industrial successes, at least up to the present. The key of Soviet economic successes is also insecurity of the individual. In place of primogeniture, they have instituted collectivism and nationalization. In place of individualism, they

²⁸. I am much indebted to Harold F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick for their stimulating comments while this section was being completed.

have maintained a secret police and a system of mutual watchfulness which enable few, if any, to be entirely certain of self or place in the scheme of things. The result is, if we overlook certain differences and examine instead the basic mechanism upon which the society works, an economic development which is impressive both in speed and in scale, at the expense of the individual who also has to "keep moving in order to stand still."

There are serious difficulties in using this model to promote economic development. Popular misconception notwithstanding, the Soviet program has been carried out within a culture that is essentially Western in character. It was part of the Russian tradition for the individual to identify himself with the state or a wider group than the family, to exuberate in religious and missionary zeal, and to regard persecution as inherent in the order of society. It is reasonable to doubt whether the same model will work as effectively or as quickly in societies where these and similar characteristics are absent. At the same time it should be noted that, among the Chinese cultural factors favoring a considerable degree of economic development under the Communist rule, at least in the near future, we must name two that are quite opposite to those operative in Russia: (a) a lack of direct opposition to, and indeed a traditional expectation of, state control or at least direction in many matters; and (b) the need for a strong government which stabilizes the currency and protects industries and commerce from strangulating interferences by the ravages of the military, the irregularities of bureaucracy, and the competition of foreign powers under unequal treaties. In addition to these two factors, we must note a third which is similar to that found in Russia and the rest of the West, at least in effect. World War II has further shaken the family and communal structures among increasingly large numbers of the Chinese population—a process already under way through a century of Western impact. The firm hands of the Communist regime have now come in to accelerate the process yet,

at the same time, encounter the yearning of the individual for mutual dependence. The state gives direction, absorbs losses, and shares profits and glory with the individual in a manner reminiscent of that which previously existed between him and the primary groups. Moreover the state, however stable, is bound to be impersonal because of its size and complexity. This, together with secret police, brain washing, and introduction of new systems of competition, cannot but generate a good deal of individual insecurity—that quality which has aided economic growth in other lands. These forces may not precipitate an industrial revolution of the magnitude of those in Soviet Russia or the capitalist West, but they may result in enough economic growth to give the country a new look. Even if this model should work with a considerable degree of success in non-Western societies, such as China, the cost in violence, misery, and social upheaval would be great. By its own admission, the Chinese Communist regime has caused the liquidation of millions of human beings. Furthermore, it is hardly conceivable that any government inviting foreign economic aid will do so with the express purpose of overthrowing itself—invariably the central step counted upon in the Communist formula.

There is a third way of engendering the necessary cultural conditions for economic development which involves neither the long historical processes of capitalistic free enterprise nor the negation of the individual characteristic of the Communist planned society. This comes somewhere between the two extremes. The insecurity necessary for economic growth will be generated by a system combining state control with individual initiative.

More specifically, we must assume at the outset that most of the people in the society which we hope to change are not hostile to the program and that such society has a government which is more or less stable whether it be a somewhat democratic organization, or one under the thumb of a single strong man, or an oligarchy. Given these conditions, it

should be possible to introduce a development program which starts with a project that fulfills some long-felt need, such as a dam, an irrigation scheme, well-digging, a factory, or road-building. From past experiences in the East, and more recently in South America, we know that such a project, with its promise of monetary reward and a chance of obtaining a mode of existence that is somewhat more comfortable than before, will usually succeed in attracting a native labor force, even though the condition of the latter may not be all that is desired according to Western standards.²⁹ However, it will be a labor force, and it will be subject to gradual education and influence toward the improvement of its permanence and efficiency.

The next problem to be tackled is that this initial attraction to the laborers, who will naturally have come from the bottom of the social ladder, will also be attractive to those who are much better off. Here the government will do well to initiate a mild inflation, say of ten or fifteen per cent. Inflation will cause hardship to the middle classes, especially the higher-leveled wage-earners and most salaried people. A mild inflation will push many of the fixed-income, white-collared workers into trading and other entrepreneurial activities. It must be noted in this connection that the inflation must be mild and not a runaway one. In the latter case, people would simply become panicky and not seek to enter relatively permanent forms of enterprise. On the other hand, inflation by itself cannot generate increasing economic development. If nothing is done beyond a mild inflation, a society of peddlers (to use an extreme metaphor) may be the result.

The next step is to revise the tax structure to favor those who move vertically or horizontally. The one may be instrumental to the other, but at any rate both are calculated as expressions of the individual's dissatisfaction with the status quo and his desire to improve himself. Vertical movement may mean climbing the wage ladder or improvement of one's position by a change, say, from being a technician to a manager

²⁹. Those who know something about the South African Union may contradict this statement. It is to be recalled that European entrepreneurs had at first little success in getting Africans to work in the factories and mines, and that, at one time or another, the Africans had to be forced to accept such work by means of the head or hut tax or other arbitrary methods. The African situation seems to me to be due to two factors, neither of which applies to the Orient or to South America today. First, when the European entrepreneurs went to work in South Africa, it was at

of some sort. Horizontal movement may include going from the traditionally sanctioned occupations to newly introduced ones, as well as leaving the ancient homesteads and venturing into new frontiers, either for the exploitation of the land or for the utilization of new resources.

The revision of the tax structure or the institution of new tax measures must not be too drastic, so as to avoid the possibility of a revolt or a revolution. The eventual aim of such measures may be to strengthen primogeniture in inheritance, but this will take a long time and must be done gradually. While these measures are under way, the system of rewards by honors must be revised so as to add attractions to new forms of incentive. The change would be aimed at introducing new varieties of achievements as objects of reward, rather than new forms of the reward. That is to say, if the government has been giving medals to those who rear big families, it may be advisable to give similar recognition to those who have produced most in the factories. Or if the government has been conferring honorary doctorates upon individuals for filial piety, let it also confer similar honors on those who have conquered especially knotty problems in the new frontier.

There is no question but that such honors will provide effective incentives. America uses this form of reward a great deal, especially in war, while Soviet Russia has extended its use to a much broader area of human activity, especially to that of production. The major precaution that a government which hopes to use honor as a means of increasing incentive to work must take is that the honor thus conferred must be meaningful with reference to traditional aspirations, and that the number of recipients of such honor at any given point of time must not be so numerous as to render it worthless.

Along with these developments there needs to be an increase in consumer goods to meet the newly acquired wealth. At any rate, as the initial industrial project gets under way, some new goods will be produced locally. The government must see to it that some new goods are imported which are not produced locally. Money, without increased consumer goods, will not only cause more

a time when Western products and the physical comfort that they entailed were not generally known. Today, throughout all my travels in the East, I do not know of any villager who is not fascinated or attracted by some Western inventions. Second, South African natives live in a world such that their oppression by the Europeans becomes so much more obvious under active contact in factories and mines than in their own home reserves that

inflation than desirable, but may also cause a loss of continued interest in the new developments on the part of the native population. It is not expected that the level of consumption in such a society will be as high as that in the United States, or even that all of the results of growth will be available in the form of products immediately available for consumption. Capital has to be provided if there is to be further expansion in the economy. Therefore, honor and other considerations must take a part of the place of the demand and enjoyment for goods, at least in the initial stages of the experiment.

Thus far, education has not been mentioned as a means of furthering economic development. The omission has not been due to any oversight. Education, as such, cannot be of much help in promoting economic development unless the process is already under way and people have reason to accept its utility. As the previously mentioned measures begin to take shape, a system of formal education, both of the liberal and the technical kinds, will help to turn out new leaders and new technicians for the society's economy. Furthermore, as the economy develops, there will be indigenous means to finance the new education. An educational program started with foreign aid before there is any sign of economic development will lack the foundation for its continuation and also run the risk of being opposed later by the natives as an alien effort designed to indoctrinate supporters for foreign interests.

This middle-of-the-way program, though possessing certain advantages over both the capitalist and the Communist routes to economic development, is not without its own complications. For this reason, those who think of a Point Four type program as a form of magic which will change an entire economy without much effort are unrealistic, but those who expect its effects to be limited to the economy alone, and to be wholly in the desired direction, may be greatly surprised. For example, the new developments as outlined above could well play into the hands of an indigenous dictator who would use them to further his own ends, to they simply have been reluctant to subject themselves to such greater discomfort. That the latter is not imaginary is shown by the fact that some South African industrialists have reportedly been bothered by many native workers tending to forget everything they learned in several years, after a brief stay back in the reserves. The people who observed such difficulties have been attributing this to the native diet and have been looking for remedies therein. But a simpler explanation is probably that human beings tend to forget what they least want to remember.

oppress his people even more than before, or to use his newly acquired economic strength to further his own aggressive ambition on weaker neighbors. In this way, a society that formerly presented a negative threat to world stability by its poverty and misery may have afterwards turned into a positive threat by its aggressive nationalism, backed up by its newly found economic and, possibly, military strength.

Or the aid program may lead to the overthrow of the strong man or to an active revolution of some kind. It may be that the changes in custom, religion, and other beliefs necessary for economic development are unpalatable to a majority of the people. Positive steps to reduce the rate of population growth, the curbing of ceremonial spending, or the modification of property rights may represent costs too great to accept. It is possible, of course, that the overthrown strong man will be replaced by another or by a new governing body more favorable to world stability. The trouble is that no such assurances can be made. Similarly, a revolution may move in a direction more congenial to the recognition of the importance of more individual liberty and to orderly internal adjustment. Again the trouble is that no such eventuality can be guaranteed. Here another complicating factor must never be lost sight of.

The United States, for example, is actively carrying out a Point Four program in industrially backward societies, many of which have shown signs of leaning toward Communist Russia. It is absurd to assume that the Soviets will do nothing in return. Every intelligence has its counterintelligence, and every weapon its counterweapon. It is highly unrealistic and foolish for the West to assume that there is no Soviet counterweapon to any Point Four program.

We thus must realize that any foreign aid program is no small venture to be carried out with petty cash, that it takes more than a spark plug to build a machine. If aid is carried through well, adequately and wisely, it may bring desirable results both to the givers and to the recipients. If aid is carried out badly or inadequately, it can lead to

consequences that are much worse than if there had been no aid at all. Or the latter eventuality may result from circumstances beyond control.

Once development gets under way, however, and as people eat and live better than before, they may have less desire for revolt or revolution. Or the threat of revolt or revolution may serve as effective checks against any dictator or oligarch too bent on aggrandizing himself. Strong men in every country need not be egotists or megalomaniacs; they may be altruistically inclined. Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Kemal Atatürk of Turkey are two outstanding altruistic leaders who will go down in history as individuals who placed their respective people's interests above those of themselves. There is little doubt that an aid program under the leadership of this type of man will have a good chance of success.

A feasible aid program should probably aim at a moderate level of economic development, in all or in a majority of the industrially backward regions, to a level higher than those prevailing in the East and in Africa, but not as high as those found in more advanced nations of the West. But even this moderate aim will require a program much more extensive, and prolonged over a much longer period of time, than most politicians, scholars, and average citizens currently envisage. To make such a program work toward desirable ends, furthermore, Americans and Europeans alike must abandon their feeling and obvious attitude of superiority toward the rest of the world. A century ago such a feeling and attitude probably would have aroused little antagonism, because the world was in much less close contact and because Western ideas of equality and freedom had much less meaning to a majority of the non-Western peoples. Unfortunately, as the demand for universal equality and freedom increased, Western conviction of its superiority seems to have increased. This attitude can only alienate the peoples whom Westerners have helped or hope to help. Neither the magnitude of the task nor the difficulty of psychological reorientation should blind us to the stakes involved. To the extent that the present tensions of human existence, in which

strife and bloodshed are part of the everyday picture, can be relieved by economic development it will be more than worth the cost.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The present problems of the underdeveloped areas are certainly primarily economic in form if not in source. That is, social-cultural attitudes have resulted in little or no material development. A broadened and enlarged development program which looks toward, not only an immediate increase in standards of living, but toward developing attitudes which will sustain this development after the external aid is withdrawn, will surely be worth while. It will be worth while too in that it will provide an outlet for energies and talents in the West which are either blocked at present or may soon be. But if we think the opening of these new frontiers is a final answer for all concerned, we may be doomed to disappointment. We may find that a not far distant future contains new problems, tensions, and crises in no small measure attributable to the very success any large-scale aid program might achieve.

What we need to realize is that economic development alone will fail to solve the world's problems, and, if pursued for its own sake, will certainly multiply them. For in spite of their impressive economic development and their enjoyment of a standard of living that mankind has never seen before, Western nations are today plagued with more terrible problems than ever. The characteristic social-cultural attitudes which have enabled Westerners to work so zealously to reach their present economic heights are at the same time generating new discontents and fresh demands for greater and better satisfaction. Such discontents and demands as a whole cannot be met except by unlimited economic expansion. In a world of limited resources (whether we take the conservative or the liberal estimates), unlimited expansion is certainly not the permanent road to general prosperity and peace.

The success of development programs depend upon how well we succeed in placing them in their proper context: We must have such programs to raise the level of material welfare of the economically underdeveloped non-Western world, so that the immediate discontent due to poverty, disease, and starvation will not serve the cause of totalitarianism. But what we need even more is perhaps another but different kind of aid programs to strengthen the human ties in the economically overdeveloped Western world, so that the restless individualism, insecurity, and competitiveness will not drive mankind to impossible economic demands and ultimate destruction.